The suboptimality of incentive contracts in a contracting model

Author(s)

Bibliographic Information

The suboptimality of incentive contracts in a contracting model

by Jacob Paroush and Jonas Prager

（Economic research reports, RR#94-01）

C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics : New York University, Faculty of Arts and Science, Department of Economics, 1994

Available at  / 1 libraries

Search this Book/Journal

Related Books： 1-1 of 1

  • Economic research reports

    C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics : New York University, Faculty of Arts and Science, Department of Economics

Details

  • NCID
    BA23503401
  • Country Code
    us
  • Title Language Code
    eng
  • Text Language Code
    eng
  • Place of Publication
    New York, N.Y.
  • Pages/Volumes
    11 p.
  • Size
    29 cm
  • Parent Bibliography ID
Page Top