Credibility
著者
書誌事項
Credibility
（Monetary and fiscal policy, v. 1）
MIT Press, c1994
- : hard
- : pbk
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注記
Bibliography: p. 471-472
Includes index
内容説明・目次
- 巻冊次
-
: hard ISBN 9780262161404
内容説明
This is the first of two volumes on a theory of macroeconomic policy that analyzes which policies are credible or politically feasible. Instead of looking at policy as an end product, the contributors approach policy as an ongoing process of revised goals, changes in tactics, and political pressures. They consider what kinds of incentives within different institutional settings, drive policy-making and the behaviour of policy-makers. The approach explains why certain monetary and fiscal policies are implemented, and provides insights into situations that occur repeatedly in macroeconomic policy, such as the bias toward government deficits, partisan competition and central bank independence. Volume 2 examines problems of policy credibility caused by incentives to deviate from announced policy. It looks at feasibility problems caused by political pressures generated by the electoral process, the politics of the public debt, issues of the redistribution of wealth and conflict over the need for economic reforms. Sections are arranged so that the first chapter introduces a topic while those that follow expand on it.
The editors provide substantial introductions to each volume, as well as short comments at the beginning of each section within the volumes.
目次
- Part 1 The credibility problem: rules rather than discretion - the inconsistency of optimal plans, Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott
- dynamic inconsistency, cooperation, and the benevolent dissembling government, Stanley Fischer
- on the time consistency of optimal policy in a monetary economy, Guillermo A. Calvo. Part 2 Reputation: rules, discretion, and reputation in a model of monetary policy, Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon
- reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information, Robert J. Barro
- sustainable plans, V.V. Chari and Patrick J. Kehoe
- social contracts as assets - a possible solution to the time-consistency problem, Laurence J. Kotlikoff et al
- sovereign debt - is to forgive to forget?, Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff. Part 3 Delegation: the optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target, Kenneth Rogoff
- the advantage of tying one's hands - EMS discipline and Central Bank credibility, Francesco Giavazzi and Marco Pagano
- the European Central Bank - reshaping monetary politics in Europe, Alberto Alesini and Vittorio Grilli
- designing institutions for monetary stability, Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini
- constitutions and commitment - the evolution of institutions governing public choice in 17th-century England, Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast. Part 4 Government financial structure: optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital, Robert E. Lucas Jr and Nancy L. Stokey
- time consistency of fiscal and monetary policy, Mats Persson et al
- why do we have nominal government debt?, Henning Bohn
- on the flexibility of monetary policy - the case of the optimal inflation tax, Guillermo A. Calvo and Pablo E. Guidotti
- servicing the public debt - the role of expectations, Guillermo A. Calvo.
- 巻冊次
-
: pbk ISBN 9780262660877
内容説明
How will the private sector react to different governmental policies? What policies will produce the most desirable outcomes? These two volumes bring together major contributions to a new theory of macroeconomic policy that analyzes which policies are credible or politically feasible, topics that are central to the practical policy debate but that traditional theory cannot address. Instead of looking at policy as an end product, the contributors approach policy as an ongoing process of revised goals, changes in tactics, and political pressures. They consider what kinds of incentives, within different institutional settings, drive policymaking and the behavior of policymakers. This approach allows more informed answers to questions of which policies are credible and which are politically feasible. It explains why certain monetary and fiscal policies get implemented, and provides insights into situations that occur repeatedly in macroeconomic policy such as the bias toward government deficits, partisan competition, and central bank independence.
Volume 1 examines problems of policy credibility caused by incentives to deviate from announced policy. Volume 2 looks at feasibility problems caused by political pressures generated by the electoral process, the politics of the public debt, issues of the redistribution of wealth, and conflict over the need for economic reforms. Sections are arranged so that the first chapter introduces a topic while those that follow expand on it. The editors provide substantial introductions to each volume as well as short comments at the beginning of each section within the volumes.
目次
- Part 1 The credibility problem: rules rather than discretion - the inconsistency of optimal plans, Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott
- dynamic inconsistency, cooperation, and the benevolent dissembling government, Stanley Fischer
- on the time consistency of optimal policy in a monetary economy, Guillermo A. Calvo. Part 2 Reputation: rules, discretion, and reputation in a model of monetary policy, Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon
- reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information, Robert J. Barro
- sustainable plans, V.V. Chari and Patrick J. Kehoe
- social contracts as assets - a possible solution to the time-consistency problem, Laurence J. Kotlikoff et al
- sovereign debt - is to forgive to forget?, Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff. Part 3 Delegation: the optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target, Kenneth Rogoff
- the advantage of tying one's hands - EMS discipline and Central Bank credibility, Francesco Giavazzi and Marco Pagano
- the European Central Bank - reshaping monetary politics in Europe, Alberto Alesini and Vittorio Grilli
- designing institutions for monetary stability, Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini
- constitutions and commitment - the evolution of institutions governing public choice in 17th-century England, Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast. Part 4 Government financial structure: optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital, Robert E. Lucas Jr and Nancy L. Stokey
- time consistency of fiscal and monetary policy, Mats Persson et al
- why do we have nominal government debt?, Henning Bohn
- on the flexibility of monetary policy - the case of the optimal inflation tax, Guillermo A. Calvo and Pablo E. Guidotti
- servicing the public debt - the role of expectations, Guillermo A. Calvo.
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