Politics
著者
書誌事項
Politics
（Monetary and fiscal policy, v. 2）
MIT Press, c1994
- : hard
- : pbk
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注記
References: p. 456-457
Index: p.[459]-465
内容説明・目次
- 巻冊次
-
: hard ISBN 9780262161411
内容説明
How will the private sector react to different governmental policies? What policies will produce the most desirable outcomes? These two volumes bring together major contributions to a new theory of macroeconomic policy that analyzes which policies are credible or politically feasible, topics that are central to the practical policy debate but that traditional theory cannot address.Instead of looking at policy as an end product, the contributors approach policy as an ongoing process of revised goals, changes in tactics, and political pressures. They consider what kinds of incentives, within different institutional settings, drive policymaking and the behavior of policymakers. This approach allows more informed answers to questions of which policies are credible and which are politically feasible. It explains why certain monetary and fiscal policies get implemented, and provides insights into situations that occur repeatedly in macroeconomic policy such as the bias toward government deficits, partisan competition, and central bank independence. Volume 1 examines problems of policy credibility caused by incentives to deviate from announced policy. Volume 2 looks at feasibility problems caused by political pressures generated by the electoral process, the politics of the public debt, issues of the redistribution of wealth, and conflict over the need for economic reforms. Sections are arranged so that the first chapter introduces a topic while those that follow expand on it. The editors provide substantial introductions to each volume as well as short comments at the beginning of each section within the volumes.
目次
- Part 1 Elections and policy cycles: incumbent performance and electoral control, John Ferejohn
- equilibrium political budget cycles, Kenneth Rogoff
- macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game, Alberto Alesina
- political cycles in OECD economies, Alberto Alesina and Nouriel Roubini. Part 2 Public debt and political instability: why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit - policy with time-inconsistent preferences, Torsten Persson and Lars E.O. Svensson
- voting on the budget deficit, Guido Tabellini and Alberto Alesina
- political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries, Vittorio Grilli et al. Part 3 Redistribution: a rational theory of the size of government, Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard
- growth, distribution, and politics, Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini
- the politics of intergenerational redistribution, Guido Tabellini
- the redistributive roles of unemployment insurance and the dynamics of voting, Randall Wright
- mobility and redistribution, Dennis Epple and Thomas Romer
- the political economy of benefits and costs - a neoclassical approach to distributive politics, Barry R. Weingast et al. Part 4 Economic reform and the status quo: resistance to reform - status quo bias in the presence of individual-specific uncertainty, Raquel Fernandez and Dani Rodrik
- why are stabilizations delayed?, Alberto Alesina and Allan Drazen
- economic reform and dynamic political constraints, Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland.
- 巻冊次
-
: pbk ISBN 9780262660884
内容説明
How will the private sector react to different governmental policies? What policies will produce the most desirable outcomes? These two volumes bring together major contributions to a new theory of macroeconomic policy that analyzes which policies are credible or politically feasible, topics that are central to the practical policy debate but that traditional theory cannot address.Instead of looking at policy as an end product, the contributors approach policy as an ongoing process of revised goals, changes in tactics, and political pressures. They consider what kinds of incentives, within different institutional settings, drive policymaking and the behavior of policymakers. This approach allows more informed answers to questions of which policies are credible and which are politically feasible. It explains why certain monetary and fiscal policies get implemented, and provides insights into situations that occur repeatedly in macroeconomic policy such as the bias toward government deficits, partisan competition, and central bank independence.
Volume 1 examines problems of policy credibility caused by incentives to deviate from announced policy. Volume 2 looks at feasibility problems caused by political pressures generated by the electoral process, the politics of the public debt, issues of the redistribution of wealth, and conflict over the need for economic reforms. Sections are arranged so that the first chapter introduces a topic while those that follow expand on it. The editors provide substantial introductions to each volume as well as short comments at the beginning of each section within the volumes.
目次
- Part 1 Elections and policy cycles: incumbent performance and electoral control, John Ferejohn
- equilibrium political budget cycles, Kenneth Rogoff
- macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game, Alberto Alesina
- political cycles in OECD economies, Alberto Alesina and Nouriel Roubini. Part 2 Public debt and political instability: why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit - policy with time-inconsistent preferences, Torsten Persson and Lars E.O. Svensson
- voting on the budget deficit, Guido Tabellini and Alberto Alesina
- political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries, Vittorio Grilli et al. Part 3 Redistribution: a rational theory of the size of government, Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard
- growth, distribution, and politics, Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini
- the politics of intergenerational redistribution, Guido Tabellini
- the redistributive roles of unemployment insurance and the dynamics of voting, Randall Wright
- mobility and redistribution, Dennis Epple and Thomas Romer
- the political economy of benefits and costs - a neoclassical approach to distributive politics, Barry R. Weingast et al. Part 4 Economic reform and the status quo: resistance to reform - status quo bias in the presence of individual-specific uncertainty, Raquel Fernandez and Dani Rodrik
- why are stabilizations delayed?, Alberto Alesina and Allan Drazen
- economic reform and dynamic political constraints, Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland.
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