Aristotle and Augustine on freedom : two theories of freedom, voluntary action and akrasia
著者
書誌事項
Aristotle and Augustine on freedom : two theories of freedom, voluntary action and akrasia
Macmillan , St. Martin's Press, 1995
- : uk
- : us
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注記
Bibliography: p. 208-212
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Aristotle and Augustine both hold that our beliefs in freedom and voluntary action are interdependent, and that voluntary actions can only be done for the sake of good. Hence Aristotle holds that no-one acts voluntarily in pursuit of evil: such actions would be inexplicable. Augustine, agreeing that such actions are inexplicable, still insists that they occur. This is the true place in Augustine's view of his 'theory of will' - and the real point of contrast between Aristotle and Augustine.
目次
Preface - PART 1: ARISTOTLE - The Limits of the Voluntary - Freedom, Ability and Knowledge - Proairesis and Practical Reasoning - The Varieties of Akrasia - PART 2: AUGUSTINE - Voluntariness and Responsibility in Augustine - Voluntas and the Voluntary - The Good Will and the Good Life - Bad Will and the Mystery of Evil - List of Works Cited - Index
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