Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring

Author(s)

• Abreu, Dilip
• Pearce, David
• Stacchetti, Ennio

Bibliographic Information

Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring

by Dilip Abreu, David Pearce, Ennio Stacchetti

（The economics series : technical report / Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, no. 487）

Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford Univ., 1986

Note

"Prepared under National Science Foundation Grants SES-8509774 and SES-83-20453"

Details

• NCID: BA25366221
• Country Code: us
• Title Language Code: eng
• Text Language Code: eng
• Place of Publication: Stanford, Calif.
• Pages/Volumes: 35 p.
• Size: 28 cm
• Parent Bibliography ID:
  • BA25327092