Naturalizing the mind

Bibliographic Information

Naturalizing the mind

Fred Dretske

(The Jean Nicod lectures / François Recanati, editor, 1994)

MIT Press, c1995

  • : pbk

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Note

Bibliography: p. [189]-203

Includes index

"A Bradford book"

Description and Table of Contents
Volume

ISBN 9780262041492

Description

How can the baffling problems of phenomenal experience be accounted for? In this discourse Fred Dretske argues that to achieve an understanding of the mind it is not enough to understand the biological machinery by means of which the mind does its job. One must understand what the mind's job is and how this task can be performed by a physical system - the nervous system. "Naturalizing the Mind" skilfully a representational theory of the qualitative, the phenomenal, the what-it-is-like aspects of the mind that have defied traditional forms of naturalism. Central to Dretske's approach is the claim that the phenomenal aspects of perceptual experiences are one and the same as external, real world properties that experience represents objects as having. Combined with an evolutionary account of sensory representation, the result is a completely naturalistic account of phenomenal consciousness. Dretske's theory of naturalistic representationalism is an approach to the study of consciousness that can pin down the slippery first-person aspect of our sensory and affective life. It distinguishes, in wholly naturalistic terms, between what we experience (reality) and how we experience it (appearance). The theory establishes a framework within which subjectivity can be studied objectively, explains the peculiar authority we enjoy about our own mental states, and provides a biologically plausible answer to questions about the function or purpose of consciousness. In the first four chapters (the original Jean Nicod Lectures), Dretske focuses on what naturalistic representationalism reveals about introspective knowledge, intentionality, qualia, inverted spectra, the biological function of conscious experience, and the possibility of knowing what alien experiences are like. Chapter five addresses anticipated philosophical objections to the theory.

Table of Contents

  • The representational character of sense experience
  • introspection
  • qualia
  • consciousness
  • externalism and supervenience.
Volume

: pbk ISBN 9780262540896

Description

Naturalizing the Mind skillfully develops a representational theory of the qualitative, the phenomenal, the what-it-is-like aspects of the mind that have defied traditional forms of naturalism. How can the baffling problems of phenomenal experience be accounted for? In this provocative book, Fred Dretske argues that to achieve an understanding of the mind it is not enough to understand the biological machinery by means of which the mind does its job. One must understand what the mind's job is and how this task can be performed by a physical system-the nervous system. Naturalizing the Mind skillfully develops a representational theory of the qualitative, the phenomenal, the what-it-is-like aspects of the mind that have defied traditional forms of naturalism. Central to Dretske's approach is the claim that the phenomenal aspects of perceptual experiences are one and the same as external, real-world properties that experience represents objects as having. Combined with an evolutionary account of sensory representation, the result is a completely naturalistic account of phenomenal consciousness. * Not for sale in France or Belgium.

Table of Contents

  • The representational character of sense experience
  • introspection
  • qualia
  • consciousness
  • externalism and supervenience.

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Details
  • NCID
    BA25861912
  • ISBN
    • 0262041499
    • 0262540894
  • LCCN
    95002229
  • Country Code
    us
  • Title Language Code
    eng
  • Text Language Code
    eng
  • Place of Publication
    Cambridge, Mass.
  • Pages/Volumes
    xvi, 208 p.
  • Size
    21 cm
  • Classification
  • Subject Headings
  • Parent Bibliography ID
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