The decision to use the atomic bomb and the architecture of an American myth
著者
書誌事項
The decision to use the atomic bomb and the architecture of an American myth
HarperCollins, 1995
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注記
Bibliography: p. [785]-811
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
On 6th and the 9th of August 1945, US B-52 bombers, Enola Gay and co., dropped their nuclear bombs on Japan, devastating two large cities Hiroshima and Nagaski, killing hundreds of thousands, polluting the earth irredeemably, and consigning millions as yet unborn to genetic defects born of mutations brought about in those few who survived the mushroom clouds. On 10th August 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. Had they done so earlier, the Japanese would have surrendered instantly. The US authorities knew Stalin was about to declare war and sought to invade Manchuria, and sought to pre-empt him, hence the nuclear annihilation unleashed just a day before. But why did the Americans kill so many and blight the future of millions more if the Japanese were to surrender anyway?
Alperovitz, a scholar of the politics of nuclear capability, has excavated some secret archives over many years, meticulously piecing together conclusive evidence in the form of presidential memoranda and letters to show that the purpose of decimating Nagasaki and Hiroshima was not to bring the dogged Japanese generals to surrender, but rather to proclaim to the whole world, to all potential aggressors, but above all to Stalin amd Molotov, that the West was in possession of a terrifying new weapon. The irony is of course, that the Soviet Union had already made great strides in its own nuclear programme, and would shortly match the West warhead to warhead.
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