Gorbachev and the German question : Soviet-West German relations, 1985-1990
著者
書誌事項
Gorbachev and the German question : Soviet-West German relations, 1985-1990
Praeger, 1995
- : hardcover : alk. paper
大学図書館所蔵 全13件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. [187]-194) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Traces the transformation of Soviet relations with West Germany from 1985 to 1990 while challenging views that Gorbachev caved in to the West on German reunification. The author gives fullest account to date of how Gorbachev translated new political thinking into actual policy change examines how internal and external factors interacted in the development of Soviet policies that helped transform postwar Europe and describes the importance of public diplomacy. Graduate students, scholars, experts, and policymakers interested in Soviet and European politics will find this analytical history and its use of English, Russian, and German-language sources and newly available memoirs of key Soviet participants invaluable.
Upon taking office in 1985, Gorbachev inherited a Soviet foreign policy intent on punishing West Germany for its support of U.S. security policy. The Soviet elite generally viewed the Federal Republic of Germany as irresponsible and inherently aggressive. But by 1990 Gorbachev acceded to the veritable incorporation of East Germany into West Germany. Upon his promotion to leadership Gorbachev began to struggle and connive to construct a foreign policy consensus around his evolving new vision of international relations. With each political victory he and his supporters advanced more profound changes in Moscow's external behavior. As a result, powerful conservative forces centered in the party apparatus grew increasingly opposed to Gorbachev's reforms and especially Moscow's new Germany policy. Yet despite the domestic political costs, Gorbachev eventually agreed to unification on terms favorable to the West because he no longer viewed this outcome as a threat to Soviet interests. Students of Soviet and European politics, Cold War historians, and international relations specialists will find this analytical history and its use of English, Russian, and German-language sources and newly available memoirs of key Soviet participants invaluable.
目次
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Introduction
Continuity and Change
Charting a New Course
Building a Reserve of Trust
The Collapse of the GDR
Moscow's Acceptance of German Unification
Conclusion
Selected Bibliography
Index
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