Regulatory takings : law, economics, and politics
著者
書誌事項
Regulatory takings : law, economics, and politics
Harvard University Press, 1995
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注記
Bibliography: p. 377-406
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Are rent controls and zoning regulations unconstitutional? Should the Supreme Court strike down the Endangered Species Act when its administration interferes with the use of private property? These questions are currently debated under the doctrine of regulatory takings, and William Fischel's book offers a new perspective on the issue.
Regulatory Takings argues that the issue is not so much about the details of property law as it is about the fairness of politics. The book employs jurisprudential theories, economic analysis, historical investigation, and political science to show why local land use regulations, such as zoning and rent control, deserve a higher degree of judicial scrutiny than national regulations. Unlike other books on this topic, Regulatory Takings goes beyond case law to buttress its arguments. Its reality checks range from reviews of statistical evidence to local inquiries about famous takings cases such as Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission. The gap between legal theory and on-the-ground practice is one reason that Fischel investigates alternative means of protecting property rights.
Local governments are often deterred from unfairly regulating portable assets by their owners' threat of "exit" from the jurisdiction. State and federal government regulations are disciplined by property-owner coalitions whose "voice" is clearly audible in the statehouses and in Congress.
Constitutional courts need to preserve their resources for use in areas in which politics is loaded against the property owner. Regulatory Takings advances an economic standard to decide when a local regulation crosses the border from legitimate police power to a taking that requires just compensation for owners who are adversely affected.
目次
Preface Introduction 1. Of Coase and Coal: Regulatory Takings in the U.S. Supreme Court 2. Eminent Domain's Democratic Origins and Economics Cycles 3. Constitutional Law, Process Theory, and Democratic Commitment 4. The Economic-Utilitarian Theories of Michelman and Esptein 5. Rational Expectations and Contractarian Conventions 6. Capitalizing on Land Use Regulation: Evidence from California 7. Zoning, Capitalization, and The Efficiency of Local Government 8. How Exit and Voice Discipline Government Excess 9. Remedies for Unfair Land Use Restrictions and Exactions Case References General References Index
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