The amateur strategist : intuitive deterrence theories and the politics of the nuclear arms race
著者
書誌事項
The amateur strategist : intuitive deterrence theories and the politics of the nuclear arms race
（Cambridge studies in political psychology and public opinion）
New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 1995
- : hard
- : pbk
大学図書館所蔵 件 / 全10件
-
該当する所蔵館はありません
- すべての絞り込み条件を解除する
注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This book, first published in 1995, explores how the everyday person reasons about nuclear strategy. James DeNardo's data reveals surprising patterns of thinking on basic issues from SDI, arms control, and proliferation to the end of the Cold War. The book describes a fascinating cast of players, including 'Nice Hawks' like Ronald Reagan, who wanted to give SDI to the Russians, and the 'NIFFs,' whose procurement rule, expressed simply, was: 'If they have it, we don't want it, but they don't have it, we should get it.' To explain his remarkable evidence, Professor DeNardo presents an innovative theory of intuitive deterrence reasoning. He then confronts the theory with data from professional nuclear strategists. His discovery that the amateur's strategic reasoning defies all conventional theories lays the groundwork for a new understanding of national security politics. His demonstration that professional strategists reason like novices - that we are all Amateur Strategists - challenges the intellectual foundations of modern deterrence theory, public opinion studies, and game theory.
目次
- 1. Introduction
- 2. A primer on the Cold War nuclear debate
- 3. An introduction to intuitive deterrence theories
- 4. Competing hypotheses about nuclear thinking
- 5. The novice strategists
- 6. The intuitive calculus of nuclear deterrence
- 7. Statistical tests of the intuitive nuclear calculus
- 8. Expert nuclear reasoning
- 9. The factional politics of strategy and the end of the Cold War arms race
- 10. Nuclear thinking after the cold war.
「Nielsen BookData」 より