Moral relativism and moral objectivity
著者
書誌事項
Moral relativism and moral objectivity
（Great debates in philosophy）
Blackwell, 1996
- : hbk
- : pbk
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. [218]-223) and index
内容説明・目次
- 巻冊次
-
: hbk ISBN 9780631192091
内容説明
Do moral questions have objective answers? This book explains and argues for relativism, emotivism and moral skepticism. In its view, moral disagreements are like disagreements about what to pay for a house: there are no correct answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral framework. Independently, Judith Jarvis Thompson examines what she takes to be the case against moral objectivity, and rejects it: she argues that it is possible to find out the correct answers to some moral questions. In her view, some moral disagreements are like disagreements about whether the house has a ghost. Harman and Thompson then reply to each other. This exchange should be useful to all students of moral theory and meta-ethics.
目次
- Part 1 Moral relativism, Gilbert Harman: moral relativism
- social contracts
- expressing basic disagreement
- universality of practical reasons?
- judgments about outsiders. Part 2 Moral objectivity, Judith Jarvis Thompson: epistemological arguments for moral scepticism
- emotivism
- evaluations and directives. Part 3 Responses: Harman's Response to Jarvis Thompson's part 2
- Jarvis Thompson's response to Harman's part 1.
- 巻冊次
-
: pbk ISBN 9780631192114
内容説明
Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism. In his view, moral disagreements are like disagreements about what to pay for a house; there are no correct answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral framework.
Independently, Judith Jarvis Thomson examines what she takes to be the case against moral objectivity, and rejects it; she argues that it is possible to find out the correct answers to some moral questions. In her view, some moral disagreements are like disagreements about whether the house has a ghost.
Harman and Thomson then reply to each other. This important, lively accessible exchange will be invaluable to all students of moral theory and meta-ethics.
目次
Preface. Part I: Moral Relativism (Harman):.
1. Moral Relativism.
2. Social Contracts.
3. Expressing Basic Disagreement.
4. Universality of Practical Reasons?.
5. Judgements about Outsiders.
Part II: Moral Objectivity (Thomson):.
6. Epistemological Arguments for Moral Skepticism.
7. Emotivism.
8. Evaluations and Directives.
Part III: Responses:.
9. Harman's Response to Thomson's Part II.
10. Thomson's Response to Harman's Part I.
Bibliography.
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