The political economy of American trade policy
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
The political economy of American trade policy
(A National Bureau of Economic Research project report)
University of Chicago Press, 1996
Available at 66 libraries
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Note
Includes bibliographical references and indexes
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Exploring the political and economic determinants of trade protection, this study provides a range of information on key American industries and documents the process of seeking and conferring protection. Eight analytical histories of the automobile, steel, semiconductor, lumber, wheat, and textile and clothing industries demonstrate that trade barriers rarely have unequivocal benefits and may be counterproductive. They show that criteria for awarding protection do not take into account the interests of consumers or other industries and that political influence and an organized lobby are major sources of protection. Based on these findings, a final essay suggests that current policy fails to consider adequately economic efficiency, the public good, and indirect negative effects. This volume should interest scholars in economics, business, and public policy who deal with trade issues.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments Introduction Anne O. Krueger 1. Trade Politics and the Semiconductor Industry Douglas A. Irwin Comment: Andrew R. Dick 2. Steel Protection in the 1980s: The Waning Influence of Big Steel? Michael O. Moore Comment: William C. Lane Comment: James R. Markusen Comment: Michael H. Moskow 3. The Political Economy of U.S. Automobile Protection Douglas R. Nelson Comment: Anne E. Brunsdale, Randi Boorstein. Comment: Richard N. Cooper 4. The MFA Paradox: More Protection and More Trade? J. Michael Finger, Ann Harrison. Comment: Robert E. Baldwin Comment: I. M. Destler 5. Precedent and Legal Argument in U.S. Trade Policy: Do They Matter to the Political Economy of the Lumber Dispute? Joseph P. Kalt Comment: Geoffrey Carliner 6. The Political Economy of U.S. Export Subsidies for Wheat Bruce L. Gardner Comment: Robert Paarlberg 7. Agricultural Interest Groups and the North American Free Trade Agreement David Orden Comment: Robert Paarlberg 8. Differences in the Uses and Effects of Antidumping Law across Import Sources Robert W. Staiger and Frank A. Wolak Comment: Kala Krishna Comment: Anne E. Brunsdale, Keith B. Anderson. 9. Conclusions Anne O. Krueger Contributors Name Index Subject Index
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