Coming to our senses : a naturalistic program for semantic localism

Bibliographic Information

Coming to our senses : a naturalistic program for semantic localism

Michael Devitt

(Cambridge studies in philosophy / general editor, Ernest Sosa)

Cambridge University Press, c1996

  • : hbk
  • : pbk

Available at  / 33 libraries

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Note

Bibliography: p. 313-327

Includes index

Description and Table of Contents

Description

Michael Devitt is a distinguished philosopher of language. In this book he takes up one of the most important difficulties that must be faced by philosophical semantics: namely, the threat posed by holism. Three important questions lie at the core of this book: what are the main objectives of semantics; why are they worthwhile; how should we accomplish them? Devitt answers these 'methodological' questions naturalistically and explores what semantic programme arises from the answers. The approach is anti-Cartesian, rejecting the idea that linguistic or conceptual competence yields any privileged access to meanings. This new methodology is used first against holism. Devitt argues for a truth-referential localism, and in the process rejects direct-reference, two-factor, and verificationist theories. The book concludes by arguing against revisionism, eliminativism, and the idea that we should ascribe narrow meanings to explain behaviour.

Table of Contents

  • Introduction
  • 1. A critique of the case for semantic holism
  • 2. The methodology of naturalistic semantics
  • 3. A case for semantic localism
  • 4. Meanings and their ascription
  • 5. Eliminativism and revisionism.

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Details

  • NCID
    BA27413865
  • ISBN
    • 0521495431
    • 0521498872
  • LCCN
    95006275
  • Country Code
    uk
  • Title Language Code
    eng
  • Text Language Code
    eng
  • Place of Publication
    Cambridge ; New York
  • Pages/Volumes
    x, 338 p.
  • Size
    23 cm
  • Classification
  • Subject Headings
  • Parent Bibliography ID
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