Growth, debt, and politics : economic adjustment and the political performance of developing countries
著者
書誌事項
Growth, debt, and politics : economic adjustment and the political performance of developing countries
(The political economy of global interdependence)
Westview Press, 1996
- : hc
- : pbk
大学図書館所蔵 全23件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
In this fascinating book, Lewis Snider convincingly argues that problems of structural adjustment arise not because the government is involved but because the way it intervenes is often counterproductive. In addition, he contends that political weakness, rather than misconceived policies or the inability of policymakers to see the consequences of their decisions, most often prevents leaders from successfully implementing economic reforms. Why have so many attempts by developing countries to correct their financial insolvency by economic adjustment failed even when those nations have adhered closely to the orthodox economic prescriptions dispensed by the International Monetary Fund? Does the fault lie in policies that are poorly conceived or implemented haphazardly or on too much government intervention in the economy?In this fascinating book, Lewis Snider convincingly argues the oppositethat problems arise not because the government is involved but because the way it intervenes is often counterproductive.
In addition, he contends that political weakness, rather than misconceived policies or the inability of policymakers to see the consequences of their decisions, most often prevents leaders from successfully implementing economic reforms.Sniders analysis focuses on three problems common to poor countries: an inability to extract sufficient resources from society; a lack of credible political and economic institutions; and as a natural outcome of these two, covert income and profit transfers that in turn serve to reinforce the institutional credibility problem.How can this vicious circle be broken? Drawing on examples and evidence from around the world, Snider demonstrates that the state must first improve its institutional credibility in the form of secure property rights and reliable contract enforcement. Only then will it be able to increase its extraction while holding down transaction costs at the level necessary for economic adjustment to succeed.
目次
- Introduction: The Political Crisis of Economic Adjustment
- Comparing the Political Strength of Nations
- Institutional Credibility and the Political Costs of Market Transactions
- Political Regime and Economic Adjustment: Can the Democracies Do It Better? After Primary Import Substitution Industrialization: Political Capacity
- and the Choice of Follow-on Industrialization Strategies
- Economic Orthodoxy and Political Power
- Conclusions.
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