Growth, debt, and politics : economic adjustment and the political performance of developing countries
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Growth, debt, and politics : economic adjustment and the political performance of developing countries
(The political economy of global interdependence)
Westview Press, 1996
- : hc
- : pbk
Available at 23 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
In this fascinating book, Lewis Snider convincingly argues that problems of structural adjustment arise not because the government is involved but because the way it intervenes is often counterproductive. In addition, he contends that political weakness, rather than misconceived policies or the inability of policymakers to see the consequences of their decisions, most often prevents leaders from successfully implementing economic reforms. Why have so many attempts by developing countries to correct their financial insolvency by economic adjustment failed even when those nations have adhered closely to the orthodox economic prescriptions dispensed by the International Monetary Fund? Does the fault lie in policies that are poorly conceived or implemented haphazardly or on too much government intervention in the economy?In this fascinating book, Lewis Snider convincingly argues the oppositethat problems arise not because the government is involved but because the way it intervenes is often counterproductive.
In addition, he contends that political weakness, rather than misconceived policies or the inability of policymakers to see the consequences of their decisions, most often prevents leaders from successfully implementing economic reforms.Sniders analysis focuses on three problems common to poor countries: an inability to extract sufficient resources from society; a lack of credible political and economic institutions; and as a natural outcome of these two, covert income and profit transfers that in turn serve to reinforce the institutional credibility problem.How can this vicious circle be broken? Drawing on examples and evidence from around the world, Snider demonstrates that the state must first improve its institutional credibility in the form of secure property rights and reliable contract enforcement. Only then will it be able to increase its extraction while holding down transaction costs at the level necessary for economic adjustment to succeed.
Table of Contents
- Introduction: The Political Crisis of Economic Adjustment
- Comparing the Political Strength of Nations
- Institutional Credibility and the Political Costs of Market Transactions
- Political Regime and Economic Adjustment: Can the Democracies Do It Better? After Primary Import Substitution Industrialization: Political Capacity
- and the Choice of Follow-on Industrialization Strategies
- Economic Orthodoxy and Political Power
- Conclusions.
by "Nielsen BookData"