Regulations, institutions, and commitment : comparative studies of telecommunications
著者
書誌事項
Regulations, institutions, and commitment : comparative studies of telecommunications
(Political economy of institutions and decisions)
Cambridge University Press, 1996
- : hc
- : pbk
大学図書館所蔵 全38件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 275-285) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
The book assesses the impact of core political and social institutions on regulatory structures and performance in the telecommunications industry in Jamaica, the United Kingdom, Chile, Argentina, and the Philippines. These core institutions are shown to influence strongly the credibility and effectiveness of regulation, and thus its ability to encourage private investment and support efficiency. Currently, privatization and regulatory reform are often viewed as the solution to the problem of poor performance by telecommunications and other public utilities. This volume argues that these high expectations may not always be met because of the way a country's political and social institutions - its executive, legislative and judicial systems, its informal norms of public behaviour - interact with regulatory processes and economic conditions. In some environments, regulatory solutions run counter to the prevailing wisdom: achieving credible commitment may require an inflexible regulatory regime, and sometimes public ownership of utilities may be the only feasible alternative.
目次
- Foreword Douglass North
- Series editor's preface
- Preface
- List of contributors
- 1. A framework for resolving the regulatory problem Brian Levy and Pablo T. Spiller
- 2. Telecommunications regulation in Jamaica Pablo T. Spiller and Cezley I. Sampson
- 3. The United Kingdom: a pacesetter in regulatory incentives Pablo T. Spiller and Ingo Vogelsang
- 4. Chile: regulatory specificity, credibility of commitment, and distributional demands Ahmed Galal
- 5. The political economy of the telecommunications sector in the Philippines Hadi Salehi Esfahani
- 6. Argentina: the sequencing of privatization and regulation Alice Hill and Manuel Angel Abdala
- Notes
- References
- Index.
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