On the optimality of individual behavior in first come last served queues with preemption and balking

Author(s)

• Hassin, Refael

Bibliographic Information

On the optimality of individual behavior in first come last served queues with preemption and balking

by Refael Hassin

（The economics series : technical report / Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, no. 404）

Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford Univ., [1983?]

Note

"A report of the Center for Research on Organizational Efficiency, Stanford University."

"Contract ONR-N00014-79-C-0685, United States Office of Naval Research."

Details

• NCID: BA29112622
• Country Code: us
• Title Language Code: eng
• Text Language Code: eng
• Place of Publication: Stanford, Calif.
• Pages/Volumes: 13 p.
• Size: 28 cm
• Parent Bibliography ID:
  • BA25327092