Social choice re-examined : proceedings of the IEA Conference held at Schloss Hernstein, Berndorf, near Vienna, Austria
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Social choice re-examined : proceedings of the IEA Conference held at Schloss Hernstein, Berndorf, near Vienna, Austria
（International Economic Association conference volume, no. 116-117）
St. Martin's Press in association with the International Economic Association , Macmillan Press, 1995-1997
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- v. 2 : cloth
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Includes bibliographical references and indexes
内容説明・目次
- 巻冊次
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v. 1 : cloth ISBN 9780312127398
内容説明
Since World War II the subject of social choice has grown in many and surprising ways. The impossibility theorems have suggested many directions: mathematical characterisations of voting structures satisfying various sets of conditions, the consequences of restricting choice to certain domaines, the relation to competitive equilibrium and the core, and trade-offs among the partial satisfactions of some conditions. The links with classical and modern theories of justice and, in particular, the competing ideas of rights and utilitarianism have shown the power of formal social choice analysis in illuminating the most basic philosophical arguments about the good social life. Finally, the ideals of the just society meet with the play of self interest; social choice mechanisms can lend themselves to manipulation, and the analysis of conditions under which given ideals can be realised under self interest is a political parallel to the welfare economics of the market. The contributors to these volumes focus on these issues at the forefront of current research.
目次
- VOLUME 1 Acknowledgements - Abbreviations and Acronyms - Notes on the Contributors - Introduction
- K.J.Arrow - PART 1: THE NATURE AND ROLE OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY - The Functions of Social Choice Theory
- K.J.Arrow - Discussion
- W.Gaertner - Individual Preference as the Basis of Social Choice
- A.Sen - Discussion
- L.Gevers - PART 2: THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREMS - Voting Models in the Arrovian Framework
- F.Aleskerov - Discussion
- N.Schofield - Arrovian Social Choice on Economic Domains
- M.Le Breton - Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation
- H.Moulin & W.Thomson - A Unified Perspective on Resource Allocation: Limited Arbitrage is Necessary and Sufficient for the Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium, the Core and Social Choice
- G.Chichilnisky - Discussion
- N.Baigent - The Possibility-Impossibility Boundary in Social Choice
- D.Campbell & J.Kelly - Index. VOLUME 2 MANIPULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION - Reasonable Mechanisms and Nash Implementation
- B.Dutta - Discussion
- B.Peleg - Notes on Strategy: Proof Social Choice Functions
- S.Barbera - Discussion
- H.Moulin - PART 2: FOUNDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF RIGHTS - Foundations and Implications of Rights
- C.Seid l - Discussion
- G.Orose l - Game Forms versus Social Choice Rules as Models of Rights
- P.Hammond - Discussion
- R.Deb - On Modelling Individual Rights: Some Conceptual Issues
- P.Pattanaik - Discussion
- M.Salles - PART 3: SOCIAL CHOICE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE - Intertemporally Consistent Population Ethics: Classical Utilitarian Principles
- C.Blackorby, W.Bossert & D.Donaldson - Discussion
- W.Thomson - Rational just Social Change
- S-C.Kolm - Discussion
- J.Weymark - Interpersonal Comparisons of the Extended Sympathy Type and the Possibility of Social Choice
- K.Suzumura - Discussion
- K.Roberts - Index
- 巻冊次
-
v. 2 : cloth ISBN 9780312127411
内容説明
Since World War II the subject of social choice has grown in many and surprising ways. The impossibility theorems have suggested many directions: mathematical characterisations of voting structures satisfying various sets of conditions, the consequences of restricting choice to certain domaines, the relation to competitive equilibrium and the core, and trade-offs among the partial satisfactions of some conditions. The links with classical and modern theories of justice and, in particular, the competing ideas of rights and utilitarianism have shown the power of formal social choice analysis in illuminating the most basic philosophical arguments about the good social life. Finally, the ideals of the just society meet with the play of self interest; social choice mechanisms can lend themselves to manipulation, and the analysis of conditions under which given ideals can be realised under self interest is a political parallel to the welfare economics of the market. The contributors to these volumes focus on these issues at the forefront of current research.
目次
- VOLUME 1 Acknowledgements - Abbreviations and Acronyms - Notes on the Contributors - Introduction
- K.J.Arrow - PART 1: THE NATURE AND ROLE OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY - The Functions of Social Choice Theory
- K.J.Arrow - Discussion
- W.Gaertner - Individual Preference as the Basis of Social Choice
- A.Sen - Discussion
- L.Gevers - PART 2: THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREMS - Voting Models in the Arrovian Framework
- F.Aleskerov - Discussion
- N.Schofield - Arrovian Social Choice on Economic Domains
- M.Le Breton - Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation
- H.Moulin & W.Thomson - A Unified Perspective on Resource Allocation: Limited Arbitrage is Necessary and Sufficient for the Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium, the Core and Social Choice
- G.Chichilnisky - Discussion
- N.Baigent - The Possibility-Impossibility Boundary in Social Choice
- D.Campbell & J.Kelly - Index. VOLUME 2 MANIPULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION - Reasonable Mechanisms and Nash Implementation
- B.Dutta - Discussion
- B.Peleg - Notes on Strategy: Proof Social Choice Functions
- S.Barbera - Discussion
- H.Moulin - PART 2: FOUNDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF RIGHTS - Foundations and Implications of Rights
- C.Seid l - Discussion
- G.Orose l - Game Forms versus Social Choice Rules as Models of Rights
- P.Hammond - Discussion
- R.Deb - On Modelling Individual Rights: Some Conceptual Issues
- P.Pattanaik - Discussion
- M.Salles - PART 3: SOCIAL CHOICE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE - Intertemporally Consistent Population Ethics: Classical Utilitarian Principles
- C.Blackorby, W.Bossert & D.Donaldson - Discussion
- W.Thomson - Rational just Social Change
- S-C.Kolm - Discussion
- J.Weymark - Interpersonal Comparisons of the Extended Sympathy Type and the Possibility of Social Choice
- K.Suzumura - Discussion
- K.Roberts - Index
- 巻冊次
-
v. 1 : uk ISBN 9780333621370
内容説明
Since World War II the subject of social choice has grown in many and surprising ways. The impossibility theorems have suggested many directions: mathematical characterisations of voting structures satisfying various sets of conditions, the consequences of restricting choice to certain domaines, the relation to competitive equilibrium and the core, and trade-offs among the partial satisfactions of some conditions. The links with classical and modern theories of justice and, in particular, the competing ideas of rights and utilitarianism have shown the power of formal social choice analysis in illuminating the most basic philosophical arguments about the good social life. Finally, the ideals of the just society meet with the play of self interest; social choice mechanisms can lend themselves to manipulation, and the analysis of conditions under which given ideals can be realised under self interest is a political parallel to the welfare economics of the market. The contributors to these volumes focus on these issues at the forefront of current research.
目次
- VOLUME 1 Acknowledgements - Abbreviations and Acronyms - Notes on the Contributors - Introduction
- K.J.Arrow - PART 1: THE NATURE AND ROLE OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY - The Functions of Social Choice Theory
- K.J.Arrow - Discussion
- W.Gaertner - Individual Preference as the Basis of Social Choice
- A.Sen - Discussion
- L.Gevers - PART 2: THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREMS - Voting Models in the Arrovian Framework
- F.Aleskerov - Discussion
- N.Schofield - Arrovian Social Choice on Economic Domains
- M.Le Breton - Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation
- H.Moulin & W.Thomson - A Unified Perspective on Resource Allocation: Limited Arbitrage is Necessary and Sufficient for the Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium, the Core and Social Choice
- G.Chichilnisky - Discussion
- N.Baigent - The Possibility-Impossibility Boundary in Social Choice
- D.Campbell & J.Kelly - Index. VOLUME 2 MANIPULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION - Reasonable Mechanisms and Nash Implementation
- B.Dutta - Discussion
- B.Peleg - Notes on Strategy: Proof Social Choice Functions
- S.Barbera - Discussion
- H.Moulin - PART 2: FOUNDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF RIGHTS - Foundations and Implications of Rights
- C.Seidl - Discussion
- G.Orosel - Game Forms versus Social Choice Rules as Models of Rights
- P.Hammond - Discussion
- R.Deb - On Modelling Individual Rights: Some Conceptual Issues
- P.Pattanaik - Discussion
- M.Salles - PART 3: SOCIAL CHOICE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE - Intertemporally Consistent Population Ethics: Classical Utilitarian Principles
- C.Blackorby, W.Bossert & D.Donaldson - Discussion
- W.Thomson - Rational just Social Change
- S-C.Kolm - Discussion
- J.Weymark - Interpersonal Comparisons of the Extended Sympathy Type and the Possibility of Social Choice
- K.Suzumura - Discussion
- K.Roberts - Index
- 巻冊次
-
v. 2 : uk ISBN 9780333646465
内容説明
Since World War II the subject of social choice has grown in many and surprising ways. The impossibility theorems have suggested many directions: mathematical characterisations of voting structures satisfying various sets of conditions, the consequences of restricting choice to certain domaines, the relation to competitive equilibrium and the core, and trade-offs among the partial satisfactions of some conditions. The links with classical and modern theories of justice and, in particular, the competing ideas of rights and utilitarianism have shown the power of formal social choice analysis in illuminating the most basic philosophical arguments about the good social life. Finally, the ideals of the just society meet with the play of self interest; social choice mechanisms can lend themselves to manipulation, and the analysis of conditions under which given ideals can be realised under self interest is a political parallel to the welfare economics of the market. The contributors to these volumes focus on these issues at the forefront of current research.
目次
- VOLUME 1 Acknowledgements - Abbreviations and Acronyms - Notes on the Contributors - Introduction
- K.J.Arrow - PART 1: THE NATURE AND ROLE OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY - The Functions of Social Choice Theory
- K.J.Arrow - Discussion
- W.Gaertner - Individual Preference as the Basis of Social Choice
- A.Sen - Discussion
- L.Gevers - PART 2: THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREMS - Voting Models in the Arrovian Framework
- F.Aleskerov - Discussion
- N.Schofield - Arrovian Social Choice on Economic Domains
- M.Le Breton - Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation
- H.Moulin & W.Thomson - A Unified Perspective on Resource Allocation: Limited Arbitrage is Necessary and Sufficient for the Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium, the Core and Social Choice
- G.Chichilnisky - Discussion
- N.Baigent - The Possibility-Impossibility Boundary in Social Choice
- D.Campbell & J.Kelly - Index. VOLUME 2 MANIPULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION - Reasonable Mechanisms and Nash Implementation
- B.Dutta - Discussion
- B.Peleg - Notes on Strategy: Proof Social Choice Functions
- S.Barbera - Discussion
- H.Moulin - PART 2: FOUNDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF RIGHTS - Foundations and Implications of Rights
- C.Seidl - Discussion
- G.Orosel - Game Forms versus Social Choice Rules as Models of Rights
- P.Hammond - Discussion
- R.Deb - On Modelling Individual Rights: Some Conceptual Issues
- P.Pattanaik - Discussion
- M.Salles - PART 3: SOCIAL CHOICE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE - Intertemporally Consistent Population Ethics: Classical Utilitarian Principles
- C.Blackorby, W.Bossert & D.Donaldson - Discussion
- W.Thomson - Rational just Social Change
- S-C.Kolm - Discussion
- J.Weymark - Interpersonal Comparisons of the Extended Sympathy Type and the Possibility of Social Choice
- K.Suzumura - Discussion
- K.Roberts - Index
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