Imperfect alternatives : choosing institutions in law, economics, and public policy
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Imperfect alternatives : choosing institutions in law, economics, and public policy
University of Chicago Press, 1996, c1994
- : pbk
Available at 16 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
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  United States of America
Note
Includes indexes
Description and Table of Contents
Description
In this text Neil Komesar argues that the emphasis on goal choice in public policy and law ignores an essential element - institutional choice. Indeed, as important as determining our social goals is deciding which institution is best equipped to implement them - the market, the political process, or the adjucative process. Pointing out that all three institutions are massive, complex, and imperfect, Komesar develops a strategy for comparative institutional analysis that assesses variations in institutional ability. He then demonstrates the value of this analytical framework by using it to examine important contemporary issues ranging from tort reform to constitution-making.
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