The immaterial self : a defence of the Cartesian dualist conception of the mind
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
The immaterial self : a defence of the Cartesian dualist conception of the mind
（International library of philosophy）
Routledge, 1996
- : pbk
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Note
Includes bibliographical references(p. 290-295) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Dualism argues that the mind is more than just the brain. It holds that there exists two very different realms, one mental and the other physical. Both are fundamental and one cannot be reduced to the other - there are minds and there is a physical world. This book examines and defends the most famous dualist account of the mind, the cartesian, which attributes the immaterial contents of the mind to an immaterial self.
John Foster's new book exposes the inadequacies of the dominant materialist and reductionist accounts of the mind. In doing so he is in radical conflict with the current philosophical establishment. Ambitious and controversial, The Immaterial Self is the most powerful and effective defence of Cartesian dualism since Descartes' own
Table of Contents
Preface, 1. THE DUALIST DOCTRINE, 2. NIHILISM AND ANALYTICAL BEHAVIOURISM, 3. ANALYTICAL FUNCTIONALISM, 4. THE TYPE-IDENTITY THESIS, 5. TOKEN-IDENTITY AND METAPHYSICAL REDUCTIONISM, 6. TOKEN-IDENTITY AND PSYCHOPHYSICAL CAUSATION, 7. THE MENTAL SUBJECT, 8. PERSONAL IDENTITY, EMBODIMENT, AND FREEDOM, Notes, Bibliography, Index
by "Nielsen BookData"
