Evolutionary games and equilibrium selection
著者
書誌事項
Evolutionary games and equilibrium selection
（MIT Press series on economic learning and social evolution, 1）
MIT Press, c1997
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. [293]-306) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, and strict Nash equilibria.
目次
- Part 1 Introduction: game theory
- equilibrium
- evolutionary games
- evolution
- evolution and equilibrium
- the path ahead. Part 2 The evolution of models: evolutionarily stable strategies
- alternative notions of evolutionary stability
- synamic systems. Part 3 A model of evolution: the aspiration and imitation model
- time
- sample paths
- stationary distributions
- limits. Appendix: proofs. Part 4 The dynamics of sample paths: dynamics
- equilibrium
- strictly dominated strategies
- weakly dominated strategies. Appendix: proofs. Part 5 The ultimatum game: the ultimatum game
- an ultimatum minigame
- numerical calculations
- relevance to experimental data? leaving money on the table. Appendix: proofs. Part 6 Drift: introduction
- the model
- when can drift be ignored? when drift matters
- examples
- discussion. Part 7 Noise: the model
- limit distributions
- alternative best replies
- trembles. Appendix: proofs. Part 8 Backward and forward induction: introduction
- the model
- recurrent outcomes
- backward induction
- forward induction
- markets. appendix: proofs. Part 9 Strict Nash equilibria: a muddling model
- dynamics
- equilibrium selection
- risk dominance
- discussion. Part 10 Conclusion.
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