Ace in the hole : why the United States did not use nuclear weapons in the Cold War, 1945 to 1965
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Ace in the hole : why the United States did not use nuclear weapons in the Cold War, 1945 to 1965
(Contributions in military studies, no. 165)
Greenwood Press, 1996
Available at 6 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. [289]-299) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Using newly released documents, the author presents an integrated look at American nuclear policy and diplomacy in crises from the Berlin blockade to Vietnam. The book answers the question why, when the atomic bomb had been used with such devastating effect against the Japanese Empire in 1945, American leaders put this most apocalyptic of weapons back on the shelf, never to be used again in anger. It documents the myopia of Potomac strategists in involving the U.S. in wars of attrition in Korea and Southeast Asia, marginal areas where American vital interests were in no way endangered. Despite the presence of hundreds, then thousands of nuclear bombs and warheads in the nation's stockpile, the greatest military weapon in history became politically impossible to use. And yet overwhelming nuclear superiority did serve its ultimate purpose in the Cold War. When American vital interests were threatened-over Berlin and Cuba-the Soviets backed down from confrontation. Despite errors in strategic judgment brought on by fear of Communist expansion, and in some cases outright incompetence, the ace in the hole proved decisive.
Table of Contents
Abbreviations Sayonara Sanity? War Scare The Soviets Draw an Ace Strategic Error First Forbearance The Cart Before the Horse French Chestnuts in the Fire The President Vacillates Muscling Up Sword of Damocles The Last Sideshow The Autobahn to Armageddon Cocked Gun Amateur Hour Harebrained Schemes Muddling Through Multilateral Folly High Noon Two Bluffs Best-Laid Plans Strategic Incompetence Unplayable Card? Endnotes Bibliography Index
by "Nielsen BookData"