Managing "command and control" in the Persian Gulf War
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書誌事項
Managing "command and control" in the Persian Gulf War
Praeger, 1996
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. [159]-163) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
During Desert Shield, the Air Force built a very complicated organizational architecture to control large numbers of air sorties. During the air campaign itself, officers at each level of the Central Command Air Forces believed they were managing the chaos of war. Yet, when the activities of the many significant participants are pieced together, it appears that neither the planners nor Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, the Joint Force Air Component Commander, knew the details of what was happening in the air campaign or how well the campaign was going. There was little appreciation of the implications of complex organizational architectures for military command and control. Against a smarter and more aggressive foe, the system may well have failed.
目次
Abbreviations
Introduction
The Black Hole and Its Impact in Desert Shield
The TACC and GAT in Desert Storm
Bomb Damage Assessment and Command and Control of the Air Campaign
Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner as the First Joint Force Air Component Commander
Conclusion
Appendix: "Black Hole" Strategic Air Campaign Planners
Notes on Sources
Index
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