What minds can do : intentionality in a non-intentional world
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
What minds can do : intentionality in a non-intentional world
（Cambridge studies in philosophy / general editor, Ernest Sosa）
Cambridge University Press, 1997
- : hbk
- : pbk
Available at 18 libraries
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Some of a person's mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or non-semantic basis for the representational powers of a person's mind, and to show that these semantic properties are involved in the causal explanation of the person's behaviour. In the process, this 1997 book addresses issues that are central to much contemporary philosophical debate. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of mind and of language, cognitive science, and psychology.
Table of Contents
- Part I. The Naturalization of Intentionality: 1. What is intentional realism?
- 2. Introduction to informational semantics
- 3. Three problems for informational semantics
- 4. Information and teleology
- Part II. The Casual Role of Intentionality: 5. The computational representational theory of mind (CRTM)
- 6. Must an intentional realist be a meaning atomist?
- 7. Functionalism and the threat of pre-emption
- 8. Explaining intentional behaviour
- 9. Conclusion: a postlude on semantics and psychology
- References
- Index.
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