Pluralism and the personality of the state

Bibliographic Information

Pluralism and the personality of the state

David Runciman

(Ideas in context / edited by Quentin Skinner (general editor) ... [et al.], 47)

Cambridge University Press, 1997

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Note

Bibliography: p. 266-274

Includes index

Description and Table of Contents

Description

Set against the broad context of philosophical arguments about group and state personality, Pluralism and the Personality of the State tells, for the first time, the history of political pluralism. The pluralists believed that the state was simply one group among many, and could not therefore be sovereign. They also believed that groups, like individuals, might have personalities of their own. The book examines the philosophical background to political pluralist ideas with particular reference to the work of Thomas Hobbes and the German Otto von Gierke. It also traces the development of pluralist thought before, during and after the First World War. Part Three returns to Hobbes in order to see what conclusions can be drawn about the nature of his Leviathan and the nature of the state as it exists today.

Table of Contents

  • Preface
  • Part I. The Personality of Associations: 1. Introduction
  • 2. Hobbes and the person of the commonwealth
  • 3. Gierke and the Genossenschaft
  • 4. Trusts and sovereigns
  • Part II. Political Pluralism: 5. Maitland and the real personality of associations
  • 6. Figgis and the communitas communitatum
  • 7. Barker and the discredited state
  • 8. Cole and guild socialism
  • 9. Laski and political pluralism
  • 10. The return of the state
  • Part III. The Personality of the State: 11. The mask of personality
  • 12. The mask of the group
  • 13. The mask of the state
  • 14. Conclusion
  • Bibliography
  • Index.

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Related Books: 1-1 of 1

  • Ideas in context

    edited by Quentin Skinner (general editor) ... [et al.]

    Cambridge University Press

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