Turf wars : how Congressional committees claim jurisdiction
著者
書誌事項
Turf wars : how Congressional committees claim jurisdiction
（American politics and political economy）
The University of Chicago Press, c1997
- : cloth
- : pbk
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 181-199) and index
内容説明・目次
- 巻冊次
-
: cloth ISBN 9780226436234
内容説明
For most bills in American legislature, the issue of turf - or which committee has jurisdiction over a bill - is crucial. This study explains how jurisdictional areas for committees are created and changed in Congress, and dissects the politics of "turf-grabbing". Political scientists have long maintained that jurisdictions are relatively static, changing only at times of dramatic reforms. David King disagrees with this premise and, combining quantitative evidence with interviews and case studies, he shows how ongoing turf wars make jurisdictions fluid. He argues that jurisdictional change stems both from legislators seeking electoral advantage and from nonpartisan House parliamentarians referring ambiguous bills to committees with the expertise to handle the issues. King shows how parliamentarians have become institutional guardians of the legislative process.
目次
Figures Tables Acknowledgments Introduction 1: Turf Wars on Capitol Hill 2: The Nature of Committee Jurisdictions 3: What Happens When Jurisdictions Are Reformed? 4: Parliamentarians as Institutional Guardians 5: Essential Strategies for Staking Claims 6: Flying Trains and Turf Wars 7: Governing Through Fragmented Committees Notes Bibliography Index
- 巻冊次
-
: pbk ISBN 9780226436241
内容説明
For most bills in American legislature, the issue of turf - or which committee has jurisdiction over a bill - is crucial. This study explains how jurisdictional areas for committees are created and changed in Congress, and dissects the politics of "turf-grabbing". Political scientists have long maintained that jurisdictions are relatively static, changing only at times of dramatic reforms. David King disagrees with this premise and, combining quantitative evidence with interviews and case studies, he shows how ongoing turf wars make jurisdictions fluid. He argues that jurisdictional change stems both from legislators seeking electoral advantage and from nonpartisan House parliamentarians referring ambiguous bills to committees with the expertise to handle the issues. King shows how parliamentarians have become institutional guardians of the legislative process.
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