Post-Cold war conflict deterrence
著者
書誌事項
Post-Cold war conflict deterrence
National Academy Press, 1997
大学図書館所蔵 全5件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliographical references
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Deterrence as a strategic concept evolved during the Cold War. During that period, deterrence strategy was aimed mainly at preventing aggression against the United States and its close allies by the hostile Communist power centers?the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies, Communist China and North Korea. In particular, the strategy was devised to prevent aggression involving nuclear attack by the USSR or China. Since the end of the Cold War, the risk of war among the major powers has subsided to the lowest point in modern history. Still, the changing nature of the threats to American and allied security interests has stimulated a considerable broadening of the deterrence concept.
Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence examines the meaning of deterrence in this new environment and identifies key elements of a post-Cold War deterrence strategy and the critical issues in devising such a strategy. It further examines the significance of these findings for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Quantitative and qualitative measures to support judgments about the potential success or failure of deterrence are identified. Such measures will bear on the suitability of the naval forces to meet the deterrence objectives. The capabilities of U.S. naval forces that especially bear on the deterrence objectives also are examined. Finally, the book examines the utility of models, games, and simulations as decision aids in improving the naval forces' understanding of situations in which deterrence must be used and in improving the potential success of deterrence actions.
Table of Contents
Front Matter
Executive Summary
1 Deterrence: An Overview
2 Implications for Deterrence Policy: Tasks for Policy Makers
3 Significance of Post-Cold War Deterrence Concepts for the U.S.
Navy and Marine Corps
Appendix A: Revising the Practice of Deterrence
Appendix B: Contemporary Strategic Deterrence and Precision-Guided
Munitions
Appendix C: Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Coalitions for
Defending Against Regional Challengers Armed with Weapons of Mass
Destruction
Appendix D: The Remaining Unique Role of Nuclear Weapons in
Post-Cold War Deterrence
Appendix E: Nuclear Weapons in Post-Cold War Deterrence
Appendix F: Notes on the Band Between Existential Deterrence and
the Actual Use of Force
Appendix G.1: Special Challenges in Extending Deterrence in the New
Era
Appendix G.2: Decisioin Modeling as an Aid to Strategic Planning
and Crisis Action
Appendix G.3: Protecting Weak and Medium Strength States: Issues of
Deterrence, Stability and Decision Making
Appendix H: Theater Missile Defense, National ABM Systems, and the
future of Deterrence
Appendix I: Deterrence: Clash and Utilization of Value Systems
Appendix J: Controlling Instabilities Caused by Rouge Governments
Appendix K: Deterrence--Quo Vadis?
目次
- 1 Front Matter
- 2 Executive Summary
- 3 1 Deterrence: An Overview
- 4 2 Implications for Deterrence Policy: Tasks for Policy Makers
- 5 3 Significance of Post-Cold War Deterrence Concepts for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps
- 6 Appendix A: Revising the Practice of Deterrence
- 7 Appendix B: Contemporary Strategic Deterrence and Precision-Guided Munitions
- 8 Appendix C: Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Coalitions for Defending Against Regional Challengers Armed with Weapons of Mass Destruction
- 9 Appendix D: The Remaining Unique Role of Nuclear Weapons in Post-Cold War Deterrence
- 10 Appendix E: Nuclear Weapons in Post-Cold War Deterrence
- 11 Appendix F: Notes on the Band Between Existential Deterrence and the Actual Use of Force
- 12 Appendix G.1: Special Challenges in Extending Deterrence in the New Era
- 13 Appendix G.2: Decisioin Modeling as an Aid to Strategic Planning and Crisis Action
- 14 Appendix G.3: Protecting Weak and Medium Strength States: Issues of Deterrence, Stability and Decision Making
- 15 Appendix H: Theater Missile Defense, National ABM Systems, and the future of Deterrence
- 16 Appendix I: Deterrence: Clash and Utilization of Value Systems
- 17 Appendix J: Controlling Instabilities Caused by Rouge Governments
- 18 Appendix K: Deterrence--Quo Vadis?
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