Bicameralism
著者
書誌事項
Bicameralism
（Political economy of institutions and decisions）
Cambridge University Press, 1997
- : hard
- : pbk
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注記
Bibliography: p. 233-242
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This book examines some fifty countries to ascertain how the chambers of bicameral legislatures interact when they produce legislation. An understanding of this interaction is essential because otherwise legislative behaviour in each chamber may be unintelligible or incorrectly interpreted. The book employs cooperative game theoretic models to establish that bicameral legislatures, when compared with unicameral legislatures, increase the stability of the status quo and reduce intercameral differences to one privileged dimension of conflict. Non-cooperative game theoretic models are used to investigate the significance of a series of insitutional devices used to resolve intercameral conflict where a bill is introduced, which chamber has the final word, how many times a bill can shuttle between chambers, and whether conference committees are called. Empirical evidence, mainly from the French Republic, is used to evaluate the arguments.
目次
- Part I. History and Geography of Bicameral Diversity: 1. Bicameralism in historical perspective
- 2. The institutions of bicameralism
- Part II. Models of Bicameral Institutions: 3. The core and the uncovered set of bicameral institutions
- 4. A model of intercameral bargaining
- 5. A model of conference committees and their proposals
- Part III. Empirical Studies of Bicameralism and Implications: 6. The outcomes of intercameral bargaining
- 7. The process of intercameral bargaining
- 8. Conference committees
- 9. Implications
- Conclusions.
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