Vertical integration in cable television

Author(s)

• Waterman, David H.
• Weiss, Andrew

Bibliographic Information

Vertical integration in cable television

David Waterman, Andrew A. Weiss

（AEI studies in telecommunications deregulation）

MIT Press , AEI Press, 1997

Note

Includes bibliographical references (p. 171-182) and indexes

Description and Table of Contents

Description

Many telecommunications companies are vertically integrating to control more stages in the production process. This book investigates in detail the economic and other social effects of vertical ownership ties between cable television system operators (such as Time-Warner and Telecommunications, Inc.) and cable programming suppliers (such as Turner Broadcasting). Does vertical integration foster anti-competitive behaviour and raise barriers to entry - to the detriment of economic efficiency, programme diversity and the First Amendment? "Vertical Integration in Cable Television" investigates the empirical evidence in light of rival theories of the competitive effects of vertical integration. In general, the authors conclude that government restraints on vertical integration in cable are ineffective or counterproductive to economic and other social objectives. Instead, the authors suggest that policy efforts should be focussed on reducing or containing the horizontal market power of cable system operators, at the local market and at the national level.

Table of Contents

• Part 1 Introduction: topics to be examined
• organization, key findings and recommendations. Part 2 Social concerns and policy issues: controversies about vertical integration
• policies toward vertical integration in cable
• related issues in cable television
• policies toward vertical integration by competitors to cable television
• criteria for evaluating social costs and benefits of vertical integration. Part 3 Market structure of the cable television industry: types of cable programming
• ownership structure
• conclusion
• appendix - data collection methodology for cable programming network ownership. Part 4 Efficiency advantages of vertical ownership in cable: transactions efficiences
• capital and creative resources of cable operators
• signalling commitment
• conclusion. Part 5 Vertical integration, strategic behaviours and the supply of cable programming: the potential role of vertical integration in anticompetitive behaviour
• MSO monopsony power, free riding and vertical integration
• other strategic advantages of vertical integration
• conclusion
• appendix - MSO monopsony power and free riding. Part 6 Empirical effects of vertical integration in cable: premium networks
• basic and hybrid networks
• the number of networks carried
• summary of results
• interpretations
• conclusion
• appendix - data collection and modelling methodology. Part 7 Vertical integration and alternative multichannel video delivery systems: vertical foreclosure theory and the role of integration
• the empirical record
• conclusion. Part 8 Summary and policy conclusions: restrictions against disadvantaging unaffiliated programme suppliers
• nondiscriminatory access to programming
• vertical disintegration
• MSO size limits
• vertical integration in cable as an antitrust issue
• vertical integration by alternative MVPDs. Part 9: postscript - the Time Warner-Turner broadcasting merger.

by "Nielsen BookData"

• NCID: BA32952687
• ISBN:
  • 0262231905
• LCCN: 96051422
• Country Code: us
• Title Language Code: eng
• Text Language Code: eng
• Place of Publication: Cambridge, Mass.,Washington, D.C.
• Pages/Volumes: xiii, 196 p.
• Size: 24 cm
• Classification:
  • LCC : HE8700.72.U6
  • DC21 : 384.55/51
• Subject Headings:
  • LCSH : Cable television -- Vertical integration -- United States
  • LCSH : Competition -- United States
• Parent Bibliography ID:
  • BA22651607