Seeing through self-deception
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Seeing through self-deception
（Cambridge studies in philosophy / general editor, Ernest Sosa）
Cambridge University Press, 1997
- : pbk
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Note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
What is it to deceive someone? And how is it possible to deceive oneself? Does self-deception require that people be taken in by a deceitful strategy that they know is deceitful? The literature is divided between those who argue that self-deception is intentional and those who argue that it is non-intentional. In this study, Annette Barnes offers a challenge to both the standard characterization of other-deception and characterizations of self-deception, examining the available explanations and exploring such questions as the self-deceiver's false consciousness, bias and the irrationality and objectionability of self-deception. She arrives at a non-intentional account of self-deception that is deeper and more complete than alternative non-intentional accounts and avoids the reduction of self-deceptive belief to wishful belief.
Table of Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1. Other-deception
- 2. Two models of self-deception
- 3. The need for an alternative model of self-deception
- 4. Functioning to reduce an anxiety
- satisfying a desire
- 5. Self-deceptive belief formation: non-intentional biasing
- 6. False consciousness
- 7. Intentional and non-intentional deception of oneself
- 8. Irrationality
- 9. What, if anything, is objectionable about self- and other-deception?
- References
- Index.
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