Strategy in Vietnam : the Marines and revolutionary warfare in I Corps, 1965-1972
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Strategy in Vietnam : the Marines and revolutionary warfare in I Corps, 1965-1972
（Praeger studies in diplomacy and strategic thought）
Praeger, 1997
Available at 9 libraries
Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. [189]-204) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Grand strategy, strategy, and tactics—the three layers of policy and action inherent to all military efforts—are the focus of this historical analysis of the dynamics of the Vietnam War. The American theory of counterrevolutionary warfare is examined in light of American military practice, especially that of the Marine Corps, during the period of America's greatest involvement, 1965-1972, and at the site of the most intense combat, the five northern provinces known as I Corps. Drawing from two schools of thought that diverge over the appropriate strategy America should have pursued in South Vietnam, this inquiry indicates that both the number of troops and their tactical employment proved inadequate for redressing the threat within the parameters America set for itself. Specifically, this work demonstrates that the counterrevolutionary warfare strategy postulated for Vietnam was largely ignored in some quarters, and sowed the seeds of defeat in others.
Table of Contents
Maps and Tables
Preface
Acronyms
Going Ashore
Paper War: Entrenching the Frictions
Instability, Insurgency and Intervention: Background to a War
In Search of Balance: The Early Years, 1965-1966
The War of Attrition in the Years of Decision, 1967-1968
The Measure of Success in the Years of Retreat, 1969-1972
Conclusion: A Harvest of Contradictions
Bibliography
Index
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