Positive political economy : theory and evidence
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Positive political economy : theory and evidence
Cambridge University Press, 1998
- : hbk
Available at 23 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
This book investigates how observed differences in institutions affect political and economic outcomes in various social, economic, and political systems. It also examines how the institutions themselves change and develop in response to individual and collective beliefs, preferences, and strategies. This volume tackles both monetary and real topics in an integrated way, and represents the first coherent empirical investigation of positive models of political economy. The various contributions discuss issues of great topicality not just for Europe, but for all developed economies: why do central banks matter? What determines their independence? How do central bank independence and exchange rate regimes affect monetary integration and activism? The volume also discusses the costs of a monetary union, unemployment benefits, and redistributive taxation.
Table of Contents
- Preface
- 1. Introduction Sylvester Eijffinger and Harry Huizinga
- Part I. Monetary Institutions and Policy: 2. Reputational versus institutional solutions to the time-consistency problem in monetary policy Susanne Lohmann
- 3. Monetary Union and monetary federalism: reciprocity political business cycles Jurgen von Hagen
- 4. The ultimate determinants of central bank independence Sylvester Eijffinger and Eric Schaling
- 5. Central bank autonomy and exchange rate regimes - their effects on monetary accommodation and activism Alex Cukierman, Pedro Rodriguez, and Steven Webb
- 6. Uncertainty, instrument choice, and the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium: microeconomic and macroeconomic examples Dale Henderson and Ning Zhu
- 7. New empirical evidence on the costs of European Monetary Union Helene Erkel-Rousse and Jacques Melitz
- Part II. Exchange Rate Policy and Redistribution: 8. Exchange rate anchors and inflation: a political economy approach Sebastian Edwards
- 9. Why capital controls? Theory and evidence Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti
- 10. The political economy of the Exchange Rate Mechanism Patrick Minford
- 11. Unemployment benefits and redistributive taxation in the presence of labour quality externalities Harry Huizinga
- Index.
by "Nielsen BookData"