A utilitarian general theory of value
著者
書誌事項
A utilitarian general theory of value
（Value inquiry book series, v. 61）
Rodopi, 1998
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注記
Bibliography: p. [179]-184
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
The thesis of this book is to develop a theory of value covering all kinds of values, based on my unified utilitarian theory. It is unique and is different from all traditional and existing theories of value.
Like the views of most psychologists and decision-scientists, value is asserted to be subjective in nature because value exists only for a subject.
Value and value judgment are considered statistical in nature in three dimensions, namely in the dimensions of subject, object, and judge.
This theory covers a modified von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory as an integral part. The three conceptions of utility held by philosophers, economicsts, and decision-scientists are unified.
The traditional and conventional classification of value into intrinsic and instrumental, which may lead to confusion, misunderstanding, and circularity, is not used. Instead, a classification based on the classification of good things in life according to the principle of exchangeability and replaceability is emphasized and used.
A decision-theoretic approach is taken for the study of actions in life. All the actions in a person's life are for the pursuit of values, and all the values pursued are related, directly or indirectly, closely or remotely, to a life plan. Thus, this utilitarian general theory of value eventually leads to a philosophy of life, which is also consequential, teleological, and utilitarian.
目次
Foreword. Preface. ONE INTRODUCTION. 1. A Utilitarian General Theory of Value. 2. Value Versus Utility. 3. The Three Conceptions of Utility. 4. Norms of Values. 5. The Scope of This Book. TWO DEFINITIONS AND PROPERTIES OF VALUE. 1. The Decision-Theoretic Approach. 2. Some Basic Definitions. 3. General Properties of Value and Utility. 4. On Pleasure, Happiness, Desire-Satisfaction, etc. THREE PSEUDO-OBJECTIVITY AND STATISTICAL NATURE. 1. Objectivity and Pseudo-Objectivity. 2. The Sources of Statistical Nature. 3. Value Judgment. 4. Extensions of the Notion of Value. 5. Statistical Nature of Moral Value. 6. Summary of the Statistical Nature of Value. FOUR UTILITY THEORY. 1. Use Value or Utility of Goods. 2. Utility of Money. 3. The von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Theory. 4. Law of Diminishing Incremental Interest. 5. The Equivalence of Two Concepts of Utility. 6. On Normalization and Terminal Utilities. 7. Recent Developments in Utility Theory. FIVE CLASSIFICATIONS OF VALUE. 1. Various Classifications of Value. 2. Intrinsic and Instrumental Values. 3. Classification of Value from Moral Point of View. 4. Classification of Value According to Good Things. 5. Further Discussion of Good Life. SIX MORAL VALUE. 1. Moral Value Versus Other Values. 2. Value of the Consequences of Moral Action. 3. Moral Value of Feeling of Moral Satisfaction. 4. Moral Value of Motive or Intention. 5. Value of Moral Action. 6. Value of Moral Principle, Virtue, or Moral Rule. 7. The Relative Importance of Moral Value. SEVEN THE VALUES OF A PERSON. 1. Various Values of a Person. 2. The Moral Value of a Person. 3. Special Features of Human Values. 4. Replaceability of the Values of a Person. 5. My Utilitarian View of Personhood. 6. The Contribution of a Person to Society. EIGHT LIFE PLAN, VALUE STRUCTURE, AND TELEOLOGY. 1. Life Plan and Values. 2. Final Value. 3. Ultimate End of Life. 4. Life Plan. 5. Value Structure, Teleology, and Determinism. NINE THEORY OF VALUE, TELEOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE. 1. Views of Teleology. 2. Life Plan Versus Teleology. 3. Decision-Theoretic Interpretation of Confucian Philosophy of Life. 4. Theory of Value, Teleology, and Philosophy of Life. Notes. Bibliography. About the Author. Index.
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