The theory of learning in games
著者
書誌事項
The theory of learning in games
（MIT Press series on economic learning and social evolution, 2）
MIT Press, c1998
- : cloth
- : pb
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
- 巻冊次
-
: cloth ISBN 9780262061940
内容説明
In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for when and why equilibrium arises is that it results from analysis and introspection by the players in a situation where the rules of the game, the rationality of the players, and the players' payoff functions are all common knowledge. Both conceptually and empirically, this theory has many problems.
In The Theory of Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players grope for optimality over time. The models they explore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.
目次
- Fictitious play
- replicator dynamics and related deterministic models of evolution
- stochastic fictitious and mixed-strategy equilibria
- adjustment models with persistent randomness
- extensive-form games and self-confirming equilibrium
- Nash equilibrium, large population models, and mutations in extensive-form games
- sophisticated learning.
- 巻冊次
-
: pb ISBN 9780262529242
内容説明
In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for when and why equilibrium arises is that it results from analysis and introspection by the players in a situation where the rules of the game, the rationality of the players, and the players' payoff functions are all common knowledge. Both conceptually and empirically, this theory has many problems.
In The Theory of Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players grope for optimality over time. The models they explore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.
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