The political economy of reform
著者
書誌事項
The political economy of reform
MIT Press, c1998
- : hbk
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
"At last, a collection of the best articles on the political economy of reform. It is one that I shall use in my classes and assign to my students."
In this book, Federico Sturzenegger and Mariano Tommasi propose formal models to answer some of the questions raised by the recent reform experience of many Latin American and East European countries. They apply common standards of analytical rigor to the study of economic and political behavior, assuming political agents to be rational and forward-looking, with expectations consistent with the properties of the underlying model. The book is organized around three basic questions: first, why do reforms take place? Second, how are reforms implemented? And third, which candidates are most likely to undertake reform? Although most of the chapters deal with policy issues in developing economies, the findings also apply to areas such as social security and health care reform in industrialized countries.
目次
- Part 1 Why? (the positive political economy of reforms) - inaction and delay: the political economy of delayed reform, Allan Drazen
- resistance to reform - status quo bias in the presence of individual-specific uncertainty, Raquel Fernandez, Dani Rodrik
- why are stabilization delayed? Alberto Alesina, Allan Drazen
- fiscal conservatism as a response to the debt crisis, Raul Laban, Federico Sturzenegger
- the benefit of crises for economic reforms, allan Drazen, Vittorio Grilli
- dynamics - recurrent high inflation and stabilization - a dynamic game, Guillermo Mondino et al
- the common property approach to the political economy of fiscal policy, Andres Velasco
- fiscal discipline in a union, Joshua Aizenman
- the rush to free trade in the developing world - why so late? why now? will it last? Dani Rodrik. Part 2 How? (strategies for reformers): the design of reform packages under uncertainty, Mathias Dewatripont, Gerard Roland
- gradualism versus Big-Bang - speed and sustainability of reforms, Shang-Jin Wei
- sequencing of economic reforms in the presence of political constraints, Cesar Martinelli, Mariano Tommasi. Part 3 Who? (the identity of reformers): promises, promises - credible policy reform via signalling, dani Rodrik
- credibility of policymakers and of economic reforms, Alex Cukierman, Mariano Tommasi
- the feasibility of low inflation - theory with an application to the Argentine case, Ricardo Lopez Murphy, Federico Sturzenegger.
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