The political economy of central banking
著者
書誌事項
The political economy of central banking
Edward Elgar, c1998
大学図書館所蔵 全30件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 214-216) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
There have been rapid and substantial changes in the importance, economic power and operation of financial markets over the past three decades. This innovative book examines the control which central banks have over financial markets, focusing on the implications of the current trend towards the granting of 'independence' to central banks. The contributors examine central banking in a number of countries including the G7 group, Italy and New Zealand. They also provide explanations for the evident instabilities of the Exchange Rate Mechanism and offer words of caution for the European Central Bank.A number of the authors challenge the foundations for the growing claims that increased central bank independence will ensure, at no cost, that inflation is both lower and less variable, finding that there are significant employment costs associated with central bank independence. The authors also discuss theoretical issues, including the meaning of, and possibilities for, monetary policy in an endogenous money framework. They go on to examine central banking in a number of countries including the G7 group, Italy and New Zealand. Finally, they also provide explanations for the evident instabilities of the Exchange Rate Mechanism in recent years and offer words of caution for the European Central Bank.
Students and scholars of financial and monetary economics will find this book invaluable as will practitioners in government and central banking.
目次
Contents: Introduction 1. The Political Economy of Monetary Policy 2. How Credible are Credibility Models of Central Banking? 3. Some Problems with the use of 'Credibility' and 'Reputation' to Support the Independence of Central Banks 4. Unemployment Costs of Inflation Targeting 5. Leadership and Stability in Key Currency Systems: A Simple Game-theoretic Approach 6. Coercing Credibility: Neoliberal Policies and Monetary Institutions in Developing and Transitional Economies 7. Credibility: Measurement and Impacts. Central Bank Experience and Euro-perspectives 8. The Political Economy of the European Central Bank 9. The Political Economy of Monetary Policy: The Effects of Globalization and Financial Integration on the EU 10. Same Tune, Different Words?: The Reaction Function of G7 Monetary Authorities 11. The Independence of Central Banks: The Case of Italy 12. Wicksellian Norm, Central Bank Real Interest Rate Targeting and Macroeconomic Performance 13. New Zealand's Experience with an Independent Central Bank Since 1989
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