Evolutionary games and equilibrium selection
著者
書誌事項
Evolutionary games and equilibrium selection
（MIT Press series on economic learning and social evolution, 1）
MIT Press, 1998
1st MIT Press pbk ed.
- : pbk
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注記
Publication year and edition not appear in digital print
Includes bibliographical references (p. [293]-306) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
The author examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games.
Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria.
目次
- Part 1 Introduction: game theory
- equilibrium
- evolutionary games
- evolution
- evolution and equilibrium
- the path ahead. Part 2 The evolution of models: evolutionarily stable strategies
- alternative notions of evolutionary stability
- synamic systems. Part 3 A model of evolution: the aspiration and imitation model
- time
- sample paths
- stationary distributions
- limits. Appendix: proofs. Part 4 The dynamics of sample paths: dynamics
- equilibrium
- strictly dominated strategies
- weakly dominated strategies. Appendix: proofs. Part 5 The ultimatum game: the ultimatum game
- an ultimatum minigame
- numerical calculations
- relevance to experimental data? leaving money on the table. Appendix: proofs. Part 6 Drift: introduction
- the model
- when can drift be ignored? when drift matters
- examples
- discussion. Part 7 Noise: the model
- limit distributions
- alternative best replies
- trembles. Appendix: proofs. Part 8 Backward and forward induction: introduction
- the model
- recurrent outcomes
- backward induction
- forward induction
- markets. appendix: proofs. Part 9 Strict Nash equilibria: a muddling model
- dynamics
- equilibrium selection
- risk dominance
- discussion.
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