Regulating financial markets : a critique and some proposals
著者
書誌事項
Regulating financial markets : a critique and some proposals
(Hobart paper, no. 135)
Institute of Economic Affairs, 1998
大学図書館所蔵 全3件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliographical references
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Financial services, financial firms and financial markets are regulated to a greater extent than most other products and services. In this radical book Professor George Benston provides a comprehensive critique of the justifications for financial services regulation, and provides an innovative proposal for reform. Executive Summary: Financial services, financial firms and financial markets are regulated to a greater extent than most other products and services. Financial service regulation goes back centuries. It provides benefits to governments (for example, from direct and indirect taxation of banks) and to regulated financial institutions (which gain where entry is restricted). Consumer protection is a common reason given for financial regulation. But consumers in financial markets are probably less subject to fraud, misrepresentation, discrimination and information asymmetry than consumers of other products. Concern about 'negative externalities' (costs born by others) is another argument for regulation. However, on examination it is clear there are few genuine externalities.
Regulations on externality grounds is justified only for financial institutions which hold government-insured deposits; for insurance companies which provide government-mandated non-contracting third party insurance ) for instance, for cars); and for companies which underwrite long-term life insurance and annuities. Financial regulation incurs costs, borne by consumers and taxpayers, which probably exceed the benefits they receive. There are substantial unintended costs (such as reduced diversification of financial institutions and the absence of less costly and more innovative products because of restrictions on entry to financial markets). An 'optimal' regulatory system' for banks would involve substantial capital requirements, periodic reporting of assets, liabilities and capital and a 'structured early intervention' system for the authorities. For government-mandated third party liability insurance, life insurance and annuities, insurance companies should be subject to capital requirements similar to those for banks.
If governments wish to protect consumers of financial products the best procedure is to establish an Ombudsman to which consumers who feel they have been mistreated can go. The proposed regulatory system 'would be almost costless to taxpayers, the regulated companies and consumers of their products and services.' Compared with existing regimes, it has the great advantage of not restricting entry to financial markets nor the introduction of new products
「Nielsen BookData」 より