Mind in a physical world : an essay on the mind-body problem and mental causation
著者
書誌事項
Mind in a physical world : an essay on the mind-body problem and mental causation
（Representation and mind / Hilary Putnam and Ned Block, editors）
MIT Press, c1998
大学図書館所蔵 件 / 全17件
-
該当する所蔵館はありません
- すべての絞り込み条件を解除する
注記
"A Bradford book."
Book consists of four revised lectures given by the author as the Townsend lectures at the University of California, Berkeley, in Mar. 1996
Includes bibliographical references (p. [135]-139) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind -- in particular, the mind-body problem, mental causation, and reductionism. Kim construes the mind-body problem as that of finding a place for the mind in a world that is fundamentally physical. Among other points, he redefines the roles of supervenience and emergence in the discussion of the mind-body problem. Arguing that various contemporary accounts of mental causation are inadequate, he offers his own partially reductionist solution on the basis of a novel model of reduction. Retaining the informal tone of the lecture format, the book is clear yet sophisticated.
目次
- Part 1 The mind-body problem - where we now are: supervenience, realization and emergence
- supervenience is not a mind-body theory
- the layered model and mereological supervenience
- physical realization
- physical realization explains mind-body supervenience. Part 2 The many problems of mental causation: three problems of mental causation
- the supervenience argument, or Descartes's revenge
- Searle, Fodor and the supervenience argument
- Block's worries about second-order properties. Part 3 Mental causation - the backlash and free lunches: unavoidability of metaphysics - the exclusion problem
- do counterfactuals help?
- "programme explanation" and supervenient causation
- does the problem of mental causation generalize?
- properties - "levels" and "orders". Part 4 Reduction and reductionism - a new look: Nagel reduction - troubles with "bridge laws"
- the functional model of reduction
- functional properties versus functional concepts
- multiple realization again
- the supervenience argument revisited
- the options - good news and bad news.
「Nielsen BookData」 より