In critical condition : polemical essays on cognitive science and the philosophy of mind
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
In critical condition : polemical essays on cognitive science and the philosophy of mind
(Representation and mind / Hilary Putnam and Ned Block, editors)
MIT Press, c1998
- : hc
Available at 25 libraries
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Note
"A Bradford book."
Bibliography: p. [215]-216
Includes index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
In this book Jerry Fodor contrasts his views about the mind with those of a number of well-known philosophers and cognitive scientists, including John McDowell, Christopher Peacocke, Paul Churchland, Daniel Dennett, Paul Smolensky, and Richard Dawkins. Several of these essays are published here for the first time. The rest originated as book reviews in the Times Literary Supplement, the London Review of Books, or in journals of philosophy or psychology. The topics examined include cognitive architecture, the nature of concepts, and the status of Darwinism in psychology. Fodor constructs a version of the Representational Theory of Mind that blends Intentional Realism, Computational Reductionism, Nativism, and Semantic Atomism.
Table of Contents
- Part 1 Metaphysics: review of John McDowell's "Mind and World"
- special sciences - still autonomous after all these years - a reply to Jaegwon Kim's "Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction". Part 2 Concepts: review of Christopher Peacocke's "A Study of Concepts"
- there are no recognitional concepts - not even RED
- there are no recognitional concepts - not even RED, part 2 - the plot thickens
- do we think in mentalese? remarks on some arguments of Peter Carruthers
- review of A.W. Moore's "Points of View". Part 3 Cognitive architecture: review of Paul Churchland's "The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul"
- connectionism and the problem of systematicity (continued) - why Smolensky's solution "still" doesn't work
- there and back again -a review of Annette Karmiloff-Smith's "Beyond Modularity"
- review of Jeff Elman et al, "Rethinking Innateness"
- review of Steven Mithen's "The Prehistory of the Mind". Part 4 Philosophical Darwinism: review of Richard Dawkins's "Climbing Mount Improbable"
- deconstructing Dennett's Darwin
- is science biologically possible? comments on some arguments of Patricia Churchland and of Alvin Plantinga
- review of Steven Pinker's "How the Mind Works" and Henry Plotkin's "Evolution in Mind".
by "Nielsen BookData"