Fences and neighbors : the political geography of immigration control
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Fences and neighbors : the political geography of immigration control
Cornell University Press, c1999
Available at 18 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Bibliography: p. 223-239
Includes index
"A project of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation"
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Why do some countries welcome new arrivals from abroad while other nations are less hospitable? Why do immigration policies change over time? This text considers several of the world's wealthiest democracies, nations that remain magnets for economic migrants as well as for refugees. Focusing on the tendency of immigrants to concentrate in specific locations in their new homelands, this book analyzes the implications of this political geography for democracies. Politics of immigration control starts at the local level, Jeannette Money asserts. Drawing on detailed evidence from Britain, France, Australia and, more briefly, the USA, she demonstrates that local support for and opposition to immigration is contingent upon economic conditions, as well the numbers of foreigners entering the country and their access to the resources of the welfare state. Whether these local pressures are translated into policies of openness or closure at the national level depends on whether the local constituencies are critical to maintaining or gaining a national electoral majority.
by "Nielsen BookData"