Why Vietnam invaded Cambodia : political culture and the causes of war
著者
書誌事項
Why Vietnam invaded Cambodia : political culture and the causes of war
Stanford University Press, 1999
- : cloth
- : pbk
大学図書館所蔵 全35件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 289-303) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
On December 25, 1978, the armed forces of Vietnam launched a full-scale invasion of Cambodia. That event marked a turning point in the first and only extended war fought between two communist regimes. The Vietnamese forced out Pol Pot's Khmers Rouge regime from its seat of power in Phnom Penh, but the ensuing war was a major source of international tension throughout the last decade of the Cold War.
This book is the first comprehensive, scholarly analysis of the causes of the Vietnamese invasion. At its core are two separate but related histories covering the years 1930 to 1978. The first concerns the continuing difficult relations between the Vietnamese communist party and the Cambodian communist movement. The second records the fluctuating and often conflicted relations between the Vietnamese communist party and the two most powerful communist states, the Soviet Union and China. These two histories are encased by a theoretical introduction and a conclusion that make clear the need for a "political culture" perspective on international relations.
The author argues that key events leading up to the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia present a historical puzzle. Many important decisions made by both the Vietnamese and Cambodian leaders are inexplicable in terms of the "rational actor" assumptions that dominate contemporary international relations theory. Instead, the author argues, these decisions can be explained only if we understand the political cultures of the rival states.
This book is the only study of Southeast Asian affairs by a Western scholar who has used the rich archives of the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The key sources drawn on constitute confidential records of the former sponsor and ally of Vietnamese communism; they also provide fresh light on Chinese and Soviet foreign policy, as well as recent events in Cambodia. They are supplemented by extensive materials from French and American archives, as well as interviews with some of the main political decisionmakers.
目次
Abbreviations Preface Introduction: international relations, rationality, and Marxist-Leninist political cultures Part I. The Local Genesis of the Conflict: 1. Roots of a conflict: the Vietnamese communists and the Cambodians, 1930-70 2. The public rise and secret fall of ' Militant Solidarity': Vietnamese and Cambodian communists, 1970-75 3. The foreign policy of democratic Kampuchea, 1975-78 4. The public disintergration of ' Militant Solidarity' in Indochina: Vietnam and Cambodia, 1975-78 Part II. The Internationalization of a Conflict: 5. Vietnam and the Communist world, 1930-68 6. North Vietnam's tilt toward the Soviet Union, 1968-75 7. The collapse of Vietnamese-Chinese relations 8. The emergence of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance 9. The consequences of the Vietnamese invasion Conclusion: history and theory Notes Bibliography Index.
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