Truth
著者
書誌事項
Truth
(Oxford readings in philosophy)
Oxford University Press, 1999
- : hbk
- : pbk
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. [397]-404) and index
内容説明・目次
- 巻冊次
-
: pbk ISBN 9780198752509
内容説明
The aim of the series is to bring together important recent writing in major areas of philosophical inquiry, selected from a variety of sources, mostly periodicals, which may not be conveniently available to the university student or the general reader. The editors of each volume contribute an introductory essay on the items chosen and on the questions with which they deal. A selective bibliography is appended as a guide to further reading.
This volume is designed to set out some of the central issues in the theory of truth. It begins with writings by F. H. Bradley, William James, Gottlob Frege, and Bertrand Russell, and continues wih the classical discussions from the middle of the century (including Wittgenstein, Quine, and Austin), ending with a selection of contemporary contributions, including essays from Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty. The collection draws together, for the first time, the debates between philosophers
who favour 'robust' or 'substantive' theories of truth, and those other, 'deflationist' or minimalists, who deny that such theories can be given.
The editors provide a substantial introduction, in which they map out this terrain and locate writers from Frege to Wittgenstein and Davidson within it. They also describe how these debates relate to more technical issues, such as work on the Liar paradox and formal truth theories.
目次
- Introduction
- PART I: BACKGROUND 'ROBUST' THEORIES
- 1. On Truth and Copying
- 2. The Nature of Truth
- 3. Pragmatism's Conception of Truth
- 4. William James's Conception of Truth
- PART II: EARLY MINIMALIST THEORIES
- 5. The Thought: A Logical Enquiry
- 6. On Facts and Propositions
- 7. Philosophical Extracts
- 8. The Semantic Conception of Truth
- 9. Philosophy of Logic
- PART III: THE EARLY MODERN DEBATE
- 10. Truth
- 11. Truth
- 12. Unfair to Facts
- PART IV: MODERN MINIMALISM AND DOUBTS ABOUT IT
- 13. Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed
- 14. The Minimalist Conception of Truth
- 15. Of What Kind of Thing is Truth a Property?
- 16. A Critique of Deflationism
- 17. The Folly of Trying to Define Truth
- 18. Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth
- 19. Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content
- Notes on the Contributors
- Select Bibliography
- Index
- 巻冊次
-
: hbk ISBN 9780198752516
内容説明
The aim of the series is to bring together important recent writing in major areas of philosophical inquiry, selected from a variety of sources, mostly periodicals, which may not be conveniently available to the university student or the general reader. The editors of each volume contribute an introductory essay on the items chosen and on the questions with which they deal. A selective bibliography is appended as a guide to further reading. This volume is designed to set out some of the central issues in the theory of truth. It begins with writings by F. H. Bradley, William James, Gottlob Frege, and Bertrand Russell, and continues wih the classical discussions from the middle of the century (including Wittgenstein, Quine, and Austin), ending with a selection of contemporary contributions, including essays from Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty. The collection draws together, for the first time, the debates between philosophers who favour 'robust' or 'substantive' theories of truth, and those other, 'deflationist' or minimalists, who deny that such theories can be given.
The editors provide a substantial introduction, in which they map out this terrain and locate writers from Frege to Wittgenstein and Davidson within it. They also describe how these debates relate to more technical issues, such as work on the Liar paradox and formal truth theories.
目次
- Introduction
- PART I: BACKGROUND 'ROBUST' THEORIES
- 1. On Truth and Copying
- 2. The Nature of Truth
- 3. Pragmatism's Conception of Truth
- 4. William James's Conception of Truth
- PART II: EARLY MINIMALIST THEORIES
- 5. The Thought: A Logical Enquiry
- 6. On Facts and Propositions
- 7. Philosophical Extracts
- 8. The Semantic Conception of Truth
- 9. Philosophy of Logic
- PART III: THE EARLY MODERN DEBATE
- 10. Truth
- 11. Truth
- 12. Unfair to Facts
- PART IV: MODERN MINIMALISM AND DOUBTS ABOUT IT
- 13. Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed
- 14. The Minimalist Conception of Truth
- 15. Of What Kind of Thing is Truth a Property?
- 16. A Critique of Deflationism
- 17. The Folly of Trying to Define Truth
- 18. Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth
- 19. Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content
- Notes on the Contributors
- Select Bibliography
- Index
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