Voting paradoxes and how to deal with them
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Bibliographic Information
Voting paradoxes and how to deal with them
Springer-Verlag, 1999
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Description and Table of Contents
Description
Voting paradoxes are unpleasant surprises encountered in voting. Typically they suggest that something is wrong with the way in dividual opinions are being expressed or processed in voting. The outcomes are bizarre, unfair or otherwise implausible, given the expressed opinions of voters. Voting paradoxes have an important role in the history of social choice theory. The founding fathers of the theory, Marquis de Condorcet and Jean-Charles de Borda, were keenly aware of some of them. Indeed, much of the work of these and other forerunners of the modern social choice theory dealt with ways of avoiding paradoxes related to voting. One of the early paradoxes, viz. that bearing the name of Condorcet, has subsequently gained such a prominent place in the literature that it is sometimes called the paradox of voting. One of the aims of the present work is to show that Condorcet's is but one of many paradoxes of voting. Some of these are pretty closely interrelated making it meaningful to classify them. This is the second main aim of this book. The third objective is to suggest ways of dealing with paradoxes. Since voting is and has always been an essential instrument of democratic rule, it is of some in terest to find out how voting paradoxes are being dealt with by past and present methods of voting. Of even greater interest is to find ways of minimizing the probability of occurrence of various paradoxes. By their very nature some paradoxes are unavoidable.
Table of Contents
Introduction.- Basic Concepts and Tools.- Alternatives and Opinions.- Preference Profile.- Pairwise Comparison and Tournament Matrix.- McGarvey`s Theorem.- Paradoxes of the Enlightenment Era.- Borda`s Paradox.- Condorcet`s Paradox.- Borda and Condorcet Compared.- How Frequent Are the Paradoxes?.- The Geometry of Voting.- The Saari Triangles.- The Conditions of Paradoxes.- The Paradoxical Act of Voting.- The Cost Calculus.- The No-Show Paradox.- Monotonicity Paradoxes.- Additional Support Paradox.- Preference Truncation Paradox.- How to Deal with Monotonicity Paradoxes?.- Compound Majority Paradoxes.- Ostrogorski`s Paradox.- Anscombe`s Paradox.- The Paradox of Multiple Elections.- The Referendum Paradox.- Simpson`s Paradox.- How to Deal With Compound Majority Paradoxes.- Intra-Profile Paradoxes.- Pareto Violations.- Inconsistency Paradox.- Choice Set Variance Paradoxes.- The q-Rules and Pareto Violations.- Tournament Solutions to Voting Paradoxes.- Paradoxes of Representation.- The Alabama Paradox.- Other Paradoxes of Hamilton Apportionments.- Schwartz`s Paradox of Representation.- How to Deal with Representation Paradoxes.- Classification of Paradoxes.- Hard and Soft Solutions.
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