The new investment theory of real options and its implication for telecommunications economics
著者
書誌事項
The new investment theory of real options and its implication for telecommunications economics
(Topics in regulatory economics and policy series / Michael A. Crew, editor, 34)
Kluwer Academic Publishers, c1999
大学図書館所蔵 全17件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliography (p. [261]-269) and index
Series number from "TREP34" on back cover
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Randall B, Lowe Piper & Marbury, L.L.R The issue of costing and pricing in the telecommunications industry has been hotly debated for the last twenty years. Indeed, we are still wrestling today over the cost of the local exchange for access by interexchange and competitive local ex change carriers, as well as for universal service funding. The U.S. telecommunications world was a simple one before the emergence of competition, comprising only AT&T and independent local exchange carriers. Costs were allocated between intrastate and interstate jurisdictions and then again, between intrastate local and toll. The Bell System then divided those costs among itself (using a process referred to as the division of revenues) and independents (using a process called settlements). Tolls subsidized local calls to keep the politi cians happy, and the firm, as a whole, covered its costs and made a fair return. State regulators, however, lacked the wherewithal to audit this process. Their con cerns centered generally on whether local rates, irrespective of costs, were at a po litically acceptable level. Although federal regulators were better able to determine the reasonableness of the process and the resulting costs, they adopted an approach of "continuous surveillance" where, like the state regulator, the appearance of rea sonableness was what mattered. With the advent of competition, this historical costing predicate had to change. The Bell System, as well as the independents, were suddenly held accountable.
目次
- Preface
- R.B. Lowe, et al. Acknowledgements. Introduction and Overview
- J. Alleman. Real Options: An Overview. 1. Real Options: A Primer
- L. Trrigeorgis. 2. Real Options Applications in the Telecommunications Industry
- S. Bhagat, et al. 3. Does Practice Follow Principle? Applying Real Options Principles to Proxy Costs in U.S. Telecommunications
- M.A. Jamison. 4. Real Options: What Telecommunications Can Learn from Electric Power
- T. Strauss. Principles. 5. Cost Models: Comporting with Principles
- R. Emmerson. 6. The Design of Forward Looking Cost Models for Exchange Telecommunications Networks
- W. Sharkey. 7. Forward Looking Telecommunications Cost Models
- T.J. Tardiff. Implications of Neglecting Real Options. 8. An Institutional Perspective on Assessing Real Options Values in Telecommunications Cost Models
- B.A. Cherry. 9. Real Options Applications for Telecommunications Deregulation
- G. Hallman, C. McClain. 10. The Poverty of Cost Models, the Wealth of Real Options
- J. Alleman. 11. The Forecasting Implications of Telecommunications Cost Models
- T.J. Tardiff. 12. The Effect of Sunk Costs in Telecommunications Regulations
- J. Hausman. Real Options: Evaluations. 13. Real Options and the Costs of the Local Telecommunications Network
- N. Economides. 14. Option Value Analysis and Telephone Access Charges
- W.J. Baumol. 15. Rethinking the Implications of `Real Options' Theory for the U.S. Local Telephone Industry
- R.N. Clarke. 16. Application of Real Options Theory to TELRIC Models: Real Trouble or Red Herring
- M.D. Pelcovits. 17. Discussion: A View from Outside the Industry
- L. Trigeorgis. 18. Rejoinder
- J. Hausman. Summary/Conclusions. 19. Real Options, False Choices: A Final Word
- E. Noam. Biographies. Index.
「Nielsen BookData」 より