Ruling the world : power politics and the rise of supranational institutions
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Ruling the world : power politics and the rise of supranational institutions
(Princeton paperbacks)
Princeton University Press, c2000
- : pbk
Available at 26 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
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  Fukushima
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  Gunma
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  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
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  United States of America
Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. [279]-306) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
The last few decades have witnessed an extraordinary transfer of policy-making prerogatives from individual nation-states to supranational institutions. If you think this is cause for celebration, you are not alone. Within the academic community (and not only among students of international cooperation), the notion that political institutions are mutually beneficial--that they would never come into existence, much less grow in size and assertiveness, were they not "Pareto-improving"--is today's conventional wisdom. But is it true? In this richly detailed and strikingly original study, Lloyd Gruber suggests that this emphasis on cooperation's positive-sum consequences may be leading scholars of international relations down the wrong theoretical path. The fact that membership in a cooperative arrangement is voluntary, Gruber argues, does not mean that it works to everyone's advantage. To the contrary, some cooperators may incur substantial losses relative to the original, non-cooperative status quo. So what, then, keeps these participants from withdrawing?
Gruber's answer, in a word, is power--specifically the "go-it-alone power" exercised by the regime's beneficiaries, many of whom would continue to benefit even if their partners, the losers, were to opt out. To lend support to this thesis, Gruber takes a fresh look at the political origins and structures of European Monetary Unification and NAFTA. But the theoretical arguments elaborated in Ruling the World extend well beyond money and trade, touching upon issues of long-standing interest to students of security cooperation, environmental politics, nation-building--even political philosophy. Bold and compelling, this book will appeal to anyone interested in understanding how "power politics" really operates and why, for better or worse, it is fueling much of the supranational activity we see today.
Table of Contents
LIST OF FIGURES ix LIST OF TABLES xi PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xiii 1. Introduction: From Anarchy to Organization 3 PART I: WHY DO NATIONS COOPERATE? 13 2. Institutions, Collective Action, and the Prospect of Mutual Gain 15 3. Winners and Losers: The Case for Theoretical Reorientation 33 PART II: HOW DO NATIONS COOPERATE? 59 4. The Efficiency Rationale for Supranational Governance 61 5. Broadening the Debate: The "Power Politics" of Institutional Design 81 PART III: NORTH AMERICAN TRADE 93 6. Jump-Starting the Free Trade Bandwagon 95 7. NAFTA and Beyond: Is Free Trade Contagious? 122 PART IV. EUROPEAN MONEY 169 8. Winners and Losers in the European Monetary System 171 9. Rigging the System: Why Did the EMS Take the Form It Did? 213 PART V. CONCLUSIONS 249 10. Rethinking International Cooperation 251 BIBLIOGRAPHY 279 INDEX 307
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