Consciousness and intentionality : models and modalities of attribution
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Bibliographic Information
Consciousness and intentionality : models and modalities of attribution
(The University of Western Ontario series in philosophy of science, v. 62)
Kluwer Academic, c1999
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Note
Bibliography: p. [345]-361
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Philosophy of mind has been one of the most active fields in philosophy for the past three decades. One of the most significant factors in the development of this discipline has been the emergence of cognitive science and the interest philosophers have taken in the empirical study of mind. Another equally important factor has been the "naturalistic tum" brought about by W. V. Quine. His proposal that normative epistemology be replaced by empirical psychology marked a radical departure from the Fregean "anti psychologism" and "apriorism" that had characterized much of the analytic tradition in philosophy. But while Quine's program of naturalization called the attention of philosophers to empirical psychology, his conception of psychology was inspired by an austere behaviorism which shunned the mentalism of intentional psychology in the Brentanian and phenomenological tradition. Thus, while agreeing with Brentano that the "intentional idiom" could not be reduced to that of the natural sciences, Quine argued that it is of a piece with the indeterminacy of translation. Most contributors of this col lection share the cognitivist stance and believe that the mind needs to be explained rather than eliminated. Three main questions are actually confronting current philosophers of mind, each addressed by one or another of the contributors to the present collection.
Table of Contents
- Preface. Part 1: Intentionality and Consciousness. Introduction
- P. Poirier. State Consciousness Revisited
- P. Jacob. Conscious Intentionality
- W. Seager. Intentionality, Consciousness and the System's Perspective
- J. Proust. Consciousness as valued procedural model of apprehension
- P. Livet. Part 2: Qualia and Perception. Introduction
- L. Faucher. The Colors and Shapes of Visual Experiences
- D.M. Rosenthal. Qualia and Representations
- E. Pacherie. Filling-in: Visual Science and the Philosophy of Perception
- E. Thompson. Perception, Particulars and Predicates
- K. Mulligan. Part 3: Content Ascription. Introduction
- M. Montminy. Pretense in Prediction: Simulation and Understanding Minds
- S. Nichols, S. Stich. Pragmatic Aspects of Content Determination
- F. Egan. On the Principle of Charity and the Sources of Indeterminacy
- D. Laurier. Davidson, Indeterminacy and Measurement
- D. Davis. Part 4: Intentional Causation and Content Individuation. Introduction
- P. Bernier. Davidson on Intentional Causation
- A. Marras. Externalism, De Dicto Beliefs, Proper Names and Reference Determination
- S. Davis. Two Concepts of Belief
- M. Seymour. References.
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