The political economy of democratic institutions
著者
書誌事項
The political economy of democratic institutions
（Locke Institute）
Edward Elgar, c2000
- : cloth
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Majority rules are generally unstable and not binding for future voters, and so are insufficient for the required security of a market economy. In this challenging book, Peter Moser argues that stability can be achieved by democratic political institutions limiting the influence of majorities.Peter Moser examines the contribution to stable policy choices of a wide range of political institutions including constitutional rules, the organizational structure of legislatures and administrative and judicial procedures. He contributes new insights about the importance of decision rules in democracies by combining theory with empirical studies. He analyses legislative procedures in the US, the European Union and Switzerland, tests a novel explanation for central bank independence, discusses the implications of political decision rules for regulatory behavior, and provides a concise survey of recent critical research on democratic institutions.
This book will be particularly welcomed by public choice scholars as well as other economists and political scientists interested in the role of democratic institutions.
目次
Contents: 1. Introduction Part I: Legislative Institutions and Public Policy: A Survey of the Literature 2. Collective Decisions under Simple Majority Rules 3. Institutional Constraints and Stability 4. Legislative Institutions and Policy Choices: Selected Applications Part II: Institutions and Stability: Checks and Balances in the Swiss Political System 5. A Model of Legislative Decisions 6. A Model of Constitutional Decisions 7. Uncertainty and Interest Groups Part III: Institutions and Policy Choice: The Conditional Influence of the European Parliament 8. Strategic Interactions in Legislative Procedures in the European Union 9. Case Study on Car Emission Standards Part IV: Institutions and Regulatory Behavior: Checks and Balances as a Prerequisite for Independent Central Banks 10. Legislative Choice of the Monetary Institution 11. Legislative Structure and Central Bank Independence Epilogue: Markets, Checks and Balances, and Commitments References Index
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