The economics of international environmental agreements
著者
書誌事項
The economics of international environmental agreements
（International library of environmental economics and policy）
Ashgate, c2000
- : hard
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Conflicts between developed and developing countries over global environmental problems, and the fact that the co-operation required to solve environmental collective action problems is typically elusive in the world of international relations, suggests a research agenda regarding how one might hop to bring about co-operation in an inherently non-co-operative international setting. In particular, what can economic theory tell us about the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs) that will protect the world's fragile environmental resources? This book collects work on IEAs which demonstrates the value of rigorous microeconomic and econometric modelling in comprehending the many and varied facets of the design and implementation in IEAs.
目次
- The problem of global environmental protection, Scott Barrett
- global environmental problems - the effects of unilateral actions taken by one country, Michael Hoel
- creating a good atmosphere - minimum participation for tackling the greenhouse effect, Jane Black, M. Levi and D. De Meza
- Strategies for the international protection of the environment, Carlo Carraro and D. Siniscalco
- self-enforcing international environmental agreements, Scott Barrett
- environmental consciousness and moral hazard in international agreements to protect the environment, Emmanuel Petrakis and A. Xepapadeas
- negotiating an agreement on global warning - a theoretical analysis, Zhiqu Chen
- the effects of collusion and limited liability on the design of international environmental agreements for developing countries, Amit Batabyal
- political institutions and pollution control, roger D. Congleton
- efficiency and distribution in greenhouse negotiations, Johan Eyckmans, S. Proost and E. Schokkaert
- a Finnish-Soviet acid rain game - non-co-operative equilibria, cost efficient and sulphur agreements, Olli Tahvonen, V. Kaitala and M. Phojola
- voluntary provision of a public good - results from a real world experiment, Werher W. Pommerehne, Lars P. Feld adn A. hart
- the voluntary provision of a pure public good - the case of reduced CFC emissions and the Montreal Protocol, James C. Murdoch and T. Sandler
- a tale of two collectives - sulphur versus nitrogen oxides emission reduction in Europe, James C. Murdoch, T. Sandler and K. Sargent.
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