Veto bargaining : presidents and the politics of negative power
著者
書誌事項
Veto bargaining : presidents and the politics of negative power
（Political economy of institutions and decisions）
Cambridge University Press, 2000
- : hbk
- : pbk
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 271-283) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
The late-twentieth century has given rise to the most concentrated period of divided party government in American history. With one party controlling the presidency and the opposing party controlling Congress, the veto has inevitably become a critical tool of presidential power. Combining sophisticated game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile Congress. Case studies of the most important vetoes in recent history add texture to the analysis, detailing how President Clinton altered the course of Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution. Offering the first book-length analysis to bring rational choice theory to bear on the presidency, Veto Bargaining offers a major contribution to our understanding of American politics in an age of divided party government.
目次
- 1. Divided government and interbranch bargaining
- 2. A natural history of veto bargaining, 1945-1992
- 3. Rational choice and the presidency
- 4. Models of veto bargaining
- 5. Explaining the patterns
- 6. Testing the models
- 7. Veto threats
- 8. Interpreting history
- 9. Conclusions.
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